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ARTICLE
TIME TO SAY LOCAL CHEESE AND SMILE AT
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS OF ORIGIN?
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND LOCAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Irene Calboli*
ABSTRACT
In this Article, I offer some considerations on a possible
compromising solution for the controversy between the European
Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) on the regulation of
geographical indications of origin (GIs) as part of the negotiations
in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
Notably, I advocate that the EU and the U.S. consider adopting a
solution similar to that adopted in the Canada and European
Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). In
particular, I note that, even though CETA accepted several of the
EU's requests to claw-back names that were not previously
protected in Canada, it also includes important exceptions to
balance the effect of this claw-back process with respect to several
(highly contested) names at issue. Thus, the solution adopted in
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CETA represents a win-win solution for Canada and the EU, and
a similar solution could resolve the GI controversy in the TTIP.
My position in this Article is that, far from being just an "EU
thing," an appropriate level of GI protection can promote local
businesses, high(er) quality products, and more accurate
consumer information about products everywhere, including in
the U.S. Notably, a rigorous system of GI protection-one that is
based on products grown and manufactured locally and where
geographical names are protected against misuse from parties
operating outside the geographical areas-would provide more
accurate product information to U.S. consumers and could
motivate U.S. producers to invest in and maintain high(er) quality
local products. In turn, this could lead to more innovation in the
U.S. food and agricultural sectors and higher quality products for
U.S. consumers.
U.S. negotiators do not need to look outside the U.S. to prove
the validity of this argument. Instead, they can simply refer to the
protection that the U.S. has historically granted to appellations of
origin for U.S.-produced wines. Wines produced in Napa, Sonoma,
and over thirty U.S. geographical areas are protected under sui
generis protection, are well known as high quality products, and
are successfully sold worldwide. Thus, the current opposition of
certain special interest groups should not deter U.S. negotiators
from pursuing a CETA-type solution to resolve the GI controversy
between the U.S. and the EU in the TTIP, as this solution is
desirable and would benefit in the long term both U.S. producers
and U.S. consumers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2014, two large groups of Senators and an
even larger group of Representatives wrote to the U.S. Secretary
of Agriculture and the U.S. Trade Representative expressing
concerns regarding the position advocated by the European Union
(EU) on geographical indications of origin (GIs) as part of the
negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP). 1 In their respective letters, the Senators and
Representatives urged the Honorable Thomas J. Vilsak and
Ambassador Michael Froman to oppose the requests presented by
the EU, namely any restrictions of the use of EU GIs in the United
States (U.S.). 2 In general, the letters lamented that the EU was
pressuring other countries to increase the protection of EU GIs in
their territories through negotiations in free trade agreements
(FTAs). 3 This strategy, the letter said, could negatively impact the
U.S., as U.S. exports would be penalized "under the guise of
protecting [EU] GIs" in these countries.4 In reference specifically
to the TTIP, the Senators expressed their concerns about the
impact that would result from the EU's request on the U.S. dairy
and meat industries, the two industries that would be most
1. See Letter from Fifty-Five U.S. Senators to Thomas Vilsack, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of
Agric., and Michael Froman, U.S. Trade Representative (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.port
man.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File id=79c9296b-a7a7-482e-8c3f-60fd9bd77fa9
[hereinafter March 2014 Letter from Fifty-Five U.S. Senators to Vilsack and Froman];
Letter from Forty-Five U.S. Senators to Thomas Vilsack, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Agric., and
Michael Froman, U.S. Trade Representative (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.common
foodnames.com/wp-content/uploads/Meat-GIs-EU-TTIP-Vilsack-and-Froman-April-2014.pdf
[hereinafter April 2014 Letter from Forty-Five U.S. Senators to Vilsack and Froman];
Letter from 177 U.S. Representatives to Thomas Vilsack, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Agric., and
Michael Froman, U.S. Trade Representative (May 9, 2014), http://www.common
foodnames.com/wp-contentluploads/House-Dairy-TTIP-Letter.pdf [hereinafter May 2014
Letter from 177 U.S. Representatives to Vilsack and Froman].
2. March 2014 Letter from Fifty-Five U.S. Senators to Vilsack and
Froman, supra note 1; April 2014 Letter from Forty-Five U.S. Senators to Vilsack
and Froman, supra note 1; May 2014 Letter from 177 Representatives to Vilsack
and Froman, supra note 1.
3. March 2014 Letter from Fifty-Five U.S. Senators to Vilsack and Froman, supra
note 1; April 2014 Letter from Forty-Five U.S. Senators to Vilsack and Froman, supra note
1; May 2014 Letter from 177 Representatives to Vilsack and Froman, supra note 1.
4. April 2014 Letter from Forty-Five U.S. Senators to Vilsack and Froman, supra
note 1.
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affected by any change in the current GI policy in the U.S.5 The
Representatives echoed these concerns primarily with respect to
the U.S. dairy industry.6 They emphasized that the "EU's abuse of
GIs threatens U.S. sales and exports of a number of U.S.
agricultural products, but pose a particular concern to the use of
dairy terms."7
Almost two years later, the controversy that prompted these
letters has not subsided. To the contrary, trade negotiators on both
sides of the Atlantic continue to argue about the extent of
protection to be given to GIs in global trade negotiations.8 In
particular, EU negotiators continue to pressure U.S. negotiators
for heightened protection for EU GIs as part of the TTIP, including
the request for "clawing-back" terms that many argue are generic
terms in the U.S.9 In addition to pressure by the EU, U.S.
negotiators are also facing the pressure of the U.S. agriculture and
food industry-above all the dairy industry-which fiercely
opposes any compromising solution between the U.S. and the EU
with respect to the EU's requests. 10 Jaime Castaneda, the
5. March 2014 Letter from Fifty-Five U.S. Senators to Vilsack and Froman, supra
note 1; April 2014 Letter from Forty-Five U.S. Senate to Vilsack and Froman, supra note
1.
6. March 2014 Letter from Fifty-Five U.S. Senators to Vilsack and Froman, supra
note 1; May 2014 Letter from 177 U.S. Representatives to Vilsack and Froman, supra note
1.
7. See May 2014 Letter from 177 U.S. Representatives to Vilsack and Froman, supra
note 1.
8. Generally, for the U.S. position and documents on the TTIP, see Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/ttip
(last visited Nov. 20, 2015). For the EU position and documents on TTIP, see
Geographical-Indications, EuR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eultrade/policy/accessing
-markets/intellectual-property/geographical-indications/ (last updated June 28, 2013). In
contrast to the EU's position of making its TTIP negotiations and proposals public, the U.S.
has revealed little to no information about its position during the negotiations. This secrecy
has caused concerns. See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, The Catch-22 of Trade Deals Done in Secret,
WASH. POST (May 15, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015
/05/15/the-catch-22-of-trade-deals-done-in-secret/.
9. See European Comm'n, EU Position Paper on the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP): Towards an EU-US Trade Deal (Mar. 20, 2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc 153331.7%20IPR%20EU%20positio
n%20paper%2020%2OMarch%202015.pdf [hereinafter EU Position Paper on GIs]. For a
general overview on the debate over terms that are considered generic in the U.S., see
Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate About Geographical
Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 323 (2006) (referring to a list released by the EU in 2003
of forty-one GIs that the EU wanted every WTO member to accept as non-generic, protected
terms and highlighting how the list quickly became known as the "claw-back" list).
10. See U.S. Congress Demands That U.S. Defend Common Food Names and Reject
EU's Aggressive Abuse of Geographical Indications, CONSORTIUM FOR COMMON FOOD
NAMES (May 15, 2014), http://www.commonfoodnames.comlu-s-congress-demands-that
-u-s-defend-common-food-names-and-reject-eus-aggressive-abuse-of-geographical-indications/
[hereinafter U.S. Congress Demands].
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Executive Director of Consortium for Common Food Names,
explicitly summarized this opposition in the following words: "[W]e
emphatically reject the EU's abusive policy of pocketing common
food names under the guise of fake geographical indications, plain
and simple.""
The controversy between the EU and the U.S. on the
regulation of GIs is not new. In fact, few topics have proven as
controversial within the international community as a whole as
the debate over the protection afforded to GIs.1 2 This controversy
started well before the adoption of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in
1994, and has continued after the adoption of TRIPS.13 Certainly,
GI supporters (at that time, primarily the EU) scored an important
victory with the adoption of TRIPS, as TRIPS imposes minimum
standards for GI protection on all members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), including the U.S.14 TRIPS also mandates
that WTO members discuss further GI protection as part of
TRIPS's built-in agenda, 15 even though the modalities of
implementation of this agenda became a source of conflict almost
as soon as TRIPS was finalized.' 6 Ultimately, the impossibility of
reaching a global consensus on GI protection has led to a forum
shift, and today both pro- and anti-GI camps have turned to
bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements to advance their
11. Id.
12. The literature on the GI debate is extensive. See, e.g., MICHAEL BLAKENEY, THE
PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (2014); DEV GANGJEE,
RELOCATING THE LAW OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS (2012) [hereinafter GANGJEE,
RELOCATING GIS]; DANIELE GIOVANNUCCI ET AL., GUIDE TO GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS:
LINKING PRODUCTS AND THEIR ORIGINS (2009); Rosemary J. Coombe & Nicole Aylwin,
Bordering Diversity and Desire: Using Intellectual Property to Mark Place-Based Products,
43 ENV'T & PLAN. A 2027 (2011); Marco Ricolfi, Geographical Symbols in Intellectual
Property Law: The Policy Options, in SCHUTZ VON KREATIVITAT UND WETTBEWERB 231
(Reto M. Hilty, Josef DrexI &WilhelmNordemann eds., 2009). But cf. Tomer Broude, Taking
"Trade and Culture" Seriously: Geographical Indications and Cultural Protection in WTO
Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 623, 626-30 (2005); Hughes, supra note 9, at 305; Kal
Raustiala & Stephen R. Munzer, The Global Struggle over Geographic Indications, 18 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 337, 359-60 (2007). For an excellent collection of works on this theme, see the
first issue of the WIPO Journal in 2014, 6 WIPO J. 1-106 (2014). Additional relevant
contributions are published in a special issue of the International Review of Intellectual
Property and Competition Law in 2015, 46 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 755,
755-913 (2015).
13. See Hughes, supra note 9, at 311-14.
14. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights arts. 22-
24, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
15. See id. arts. 23(4), 24(1).
16. See discussion infra Part II (analysing the differing views of WTO members on
TRIPS's GI built-in agenda).
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respective positions on GIs."' As I elaborate in Part II, the EU
considerably strengthens its pro-GI policy in several non-EU
countries, precisely through FTAs. However, this practice has
increased the resentment of the U.S. industry against the EU, as
noted by the U.S. Senators and Representatives in their letters. In
turn, this resentment has further complicated the ongoing TTIP
negotiations (and the GI debate in general).18
This situation is particularly unfortunate because GIs can
serve as an important tool for local economic development19 not
only in the EU but also within the U.S., despite the opposition of
certain industrial sectors. As I explain in this Article, the current
opposition to GIs in the U.S. stems from both the fear of short-term
relabeling costs for the affected products as well as the fear of
long-term loss in market share for these products, both with
respect to national sales and internationally. 20 Due to these fears,
representatives of the negatively affected industrial sectors have
voiced strong opposition to any change in current GI policy in the
U.S., and have pressured Senators and Representatives to support
their cause. 21 Unquestionably, these groups have influence in
national politics, which has contributed to political pressure on the
U.S. Trade Representative while negotiating with the EU. The
result of this pressure is, however, detrimental to the U.S. and
TTIP negotiations in general, as U.S. negotiators can no longer
attempt to identify a mutually agreeable solution because any
compromise between the U.S. and the EU necessarily requires
17. See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text (examining the post-TRIPS
negotiations gridlock and the resulting push from the EU and the U.S. for bilateral and
plurilateral agreements addressing GIs).
18. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing how the EU has been
able to strengthen its pro-GI policy through one-to-one agreements and how these
agreements will complicate the TTIP negotiations).
19. In this Article, I argue that GIs benefit economic development, particularly local
and rural development. I previously made this argument in the following related
publications: Irene Calboli, Expanding the Protection of Geographical Indications of Origin
Under TRIPs: "Old" Debate or "New" Opportunity?, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 181,
186, 200-01 (2006) [hereinafter Calboli, Expanding the Protection of GIs]; Irene Calboli, In
Territorio Veritas: Bringing Geographical Coherence in the Definition of Geographical
Indications of Origin Under TRIPs, 6 WIPO J. 57, 60 (2014) [hereinafter Calboli, In
Territorio Veritas]; Irene Calboli, Of Markets, Culture, and Terroir: The Unique Economic
and Culture-Related Benefits of Geographical Indications of Origin, in INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 433, 447-49, 457-62
(Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2015) [hereinafter Calboli, Markets, Culture and Terroir].
20. See infra notes 122-26, 133-37 and accompanying text (explaining that fear of
market-share loss stems from the belief that if consumers were better informed they would
actively choose to switch from U.S.-made products to authentic products made in the EU).
21. See Say Bye Bye to Parmesan, Muenster and Feta- Europe Wants Its Cheese Back,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/mar/11/europe
-trade-talks-cheese-back-parmesan-feta; U.S. Congress Demands, supra note 10.
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some concession from the U.S. Instead, any concession is fiercely
opposed by the negatively affected U.S. industries, and in turn
U.S. politicians. 22 Still, a compromising solution on the issue is
desirable, as it would benefit in the long term both U.S. producers
and U.S. consumers.23
In this Article, I attempt to offer some considerations on a
possible compromising solution in this respect. At this time, my
considerations are directed primarily to TTIP negotiators and,
more generally, to U.S. policy-makers. 24 Notably, I advocate that
the U.S. consider adopting, as part of the TTIP negotiations, a
solution similar to that adopted in the Canada and European
Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). 25
Under CETA, Canada has accepted several of the EU's requests to
claw-back names that were not previously protected in Canada but
are protected in the EU as GIs. 2 6 The EU's requests in CETA were
essentially the same requests that the EU has advanced in the
TTIP negotiations. However, CETA includes important exceptions
to balance the effect of this claw-back process with respect to the
names of several cheeses, namely "Asiago," "Feta," "Fontina,"
22. See March 2014 Letter from Fifty-Five U.S. Senators to Vilsack and Froman,
supra note 1; April 2014 Letter from Forty-Five U.S. Senators to Vilsack and Froman, supra
note 1; May 2014 Letter from 177 U.S. Representatives to Vilsack and Froman, supra note
1.
23. See infra Part IV (discussing the benefits of a GI compromise such as creating
better informed consumers, promoting environmentally sustainable productions, and
encouraging local development).
24. I also remain aware that, after some emotional moments in the U.S. Congress
and Senate, a new Trade Promotion Authority bill was passed and signed into law at the
end of June 2015, and that an agreement was reached over a final text of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) in October 2015-both of which indicate that the U.S. and the EU will
continue and likely conclude negotiations in the TTIP. See Bipartisan Congressional Trade
Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-26, § 102(b)(3)(U), 129 Stat. 320,
323 (2015) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 4201) ("The principal negotiating objective of the
United States with respect to agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United
States exports . . . by ... eliminating and preventing the undermining of market access for
United States products through improper use of a country's system for protecting or
recognizing geographical indications, including failing to ensure transparency and
procedural fairness and protecting generic terms."); Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific
Partnership Is Reached, but Faces Scrutiny in Congress, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 5, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/business/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal-is-reach
ed.html?_r-0. The final text of the Intellectual Property Chapter of the TPP was released
by the Office of United States Trade Representative on November 5, 2015 (the text was
previously leaked by Wikileaks on October 9, 2015). See Trans-Pacific Partnership, ch. 18,
Intellectual Property, Oct. 5, 2015, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-
Intellectual-Property.pdf [hereinafter TPP, Intellectual Property Chapter].
25. See Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement, Can.-EU, Consolidated
CETA Text, ch. 22, Intellectual Property, Sept. 26, 2014, http://trade.ec.europa.eu
/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf [hereinafter CETA, Intellectual Property
Chapter].
26. Id. arts. 7.4, 7.6(2), Annex I, pts. A-B.
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"Gorgonzola," and "Munster."2 7  Under CETA, Canadian
businesses that are currently using these names would not be
affected thanks to a grandfather clause for existing users.28
Moreover, CETA establishes that these names could be used also
by future users in Canada so long as they are accompanied by
delocalizing terms such as "kind," "type," "style," "imitation," or
the like.29 This solution allows Canadian businesses, and generally
businesses operating in Canada, to continue their existing
activities, or plan future activities, with minor disruptions. CETA
also provides exceptions for several other names and permits the
use of several EU GIs in their English and French translations. 30
However, CETA accepts a long-term commitment to inform
Canadian consumers about the accurate geographical origin of the
products produced or distributed in Canada both with respect to
Canadian and EU products.3 '
The solution adopted in CETA certainly represents a win-win
solution for Canada and the EU. 32 Thus, a similar solution could
resolve the GI controversy in the TTIP, despite the opposition of
the U.S. dairy and meat industries. In this Article, I support this
solution, but not in order to favor EU interests to the detriment of
U.S. interests. 33 In fact, I criticize the expansionist approach to the
protection and definition of GIs that the EU promotes as much as
I criticize U.S. opposition to any change in GI protection in the
27. Id. art. 7.6(1)-(2).
28. Id. art. 7.6(2) (providing that the protection of geographical indications would not
prevent the use of the indication by someone who had commercial use of the indication prior
to October 18, 2013).
29. Id. art. 7.6(1). These names are also highlighted with an asterisk in Annex I, Part
A. Id. Annex I, pt. A.
30. See CETA, Intellectual Property Chapter, supra note 25, art. 7.6(1)-(4), Annex I.
31. In a related publication, I develop further the argument that GI protection
could motivate consumers to better appreciate geography on a broader scale. For
example, in today's integrated world, citizens of every country should know that
Napa Valley is a region of northern California, Darjeeling a region of northern India,
Champagne a region of France, that Bologna is a city in Italy (and home to the oldest
university in the Western world), and so on. Notably, GI protection facilitates the
acquisition of information about accurate geographical origin, and thus geography
in general, by consumers, and the public at large. See Irene Calboli, Reconciling
Tradition and Innovation: Geographical Indications of Origin as Incentives for Local
Development and Expressions of a "Good Quality Life," in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ALTERNATIVE REGIMES: IS THERE LIFE OUTSIDE THE BIG THREE? (Susy Frankel
& Daniel Gervais eds., forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).
32. See discussion infra Part V (asserting that a system similar to CETA would be a
win-win for the U.S. and the EU because it benefits both local developments and consumers
on both sides of the Atlantic).
33. See discussion infra Part IV (arguing that GIs have many advantages, including
fostering economic benefits and promoting higher quality local markets for countries
implementing a rigorous GI-protection system).
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U.S. 3 4 Instead, I support a CETA-style solution in the TTIP
because I genuinely believe that a rigorous system of GI
protection-one that is based on products grown and
manufactured locally and where geographical names are protected
against misuse from parties operating outside the geographical
areas-can considerably benefit consumers in any country
including the U.S. In particular, I believe that a rigorous system
of GI protection can motivate producers to invest in and maintain
high(er) quality local products. Certainly, a change towards a
stricter policy on GIs will limit the ability of U.S. producers to copy
EU names for their products. However, this could motivate U.S.
producers to bring more innovation to the U.S. food and
agricultural sectors rather than continuing to produce products
that are, to a considerable extent, replicas of foreign
GI-denominated products (frequently of a lower quality).35 U.S.
negotiators do not need to look outside the U.S. to prove the
validity of this argument. Instead, they can simply refer to the
protection that the U.S. has historically granted to appellations of
origin for U.S.-produced wines.36 Wines produced in Napa,
Sonoma, and over thirty U.S. geographical areas are protected
under sui generis protection.37 Many of these wines are well known
as high quality products and are successfully sold worldwide.38
Ultimately, my position in this Article is that, far from being
just an "EU thing," an appropriate level of GI protection can
promote local businesses, high(er) quality products, and more
accurate consumer information about products everywhere, in the
U.S. as much as the EU or any other country. 39 Perhaps this is not
the type of public (trade and agricultural) policy objective that
34. See notes 66-73, 162-82 and accompanying text (arguing that an expanded
definition of GIs including products that do not fully originate from the regions goes beyond
the original rationale for GI protection).
35. See Calboli, Markets, Culture and Terroir, supra note 19, at 460 (making this
argument with respect to GIs in general); see also Irene Calboli, Intellectual Property
Protection for Fame, Luxury, Wine, and Spirits: Lex Specialis for a Corporate "Dolce Vita"
or a "Good-Quality Life'?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES: IS
IPA LEX SPECALIS9 156 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2015) [hereinafter Calboli, Dolce Vita].
36. See discussion infra Part IV.
37. See discussion infra Part III (arguing that despite claims of irreconcilable
differences, the EU's system of sui generis protection is similar to the U.S. system, as
demonstrated by the protection for wine appellations in the U.S.).
38. See Dave McIntyre, Amid the Colors and Critters, California's Legacy
Winemakers Still Thrive, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2013, at E5 ("California has become a world
leader in winemaking technologies and environmental stewardship of vineyards, with more
innovations to come. . . .").
39. See discussion infra Parts IV-V; see also Tim Josling, Presidential Address, The
War on Terroir: Geographical Indications as a Transatlantic Trade Conflict, 57 J. AGRIC.
ECON. 337, 351 (2006).
2015] 381
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some members of the U.S. industry-including some businesses
within the dairy and meat industries-would like to promote in
the U.S. at this time due to the associated costs of this policy. Yet,
a public (trade and agricultural) policy focused on increasing
consumer information and promoting local development would
certainly benefit consumers and local producers, and in turn local
development in the U.S. Thus, the current opposition of certain
special interest groups should not deter U.S. negotiators from
pursuing a CETA-type solution to resolve the GI controversy
between the U.S. and the EU in the TTIP.40
II. THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND THE CONTROVERSIAL
DEBATE ON GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS OF ORIGIN.
In this Part, I briefly review the international framework of
GI protection as necessary background information. As indicated
earlier, the adoption of TRIPS in 1994 brought global attention to
the type of international protection granted to GIs. This turned
into a relative victory for GI supporters, particularly the EU, in
that they managed to introduce several GI-related provisions into
TRIPS. 41 Prior to TRIPS, the most relevant sources for
international GI protection were scattered in three separate
agreements: the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (Paris Convention), 42 the Madrid Agreement for the
Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods
(Madrid Agreement), 43 and the Lisbon Agreement for the
Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International
Registration (Lisbon Agreement). 44 An additional agreement, the
International Convention on the Use of Appellations of Origin and
Denominations of Cheeses (Stresa Convention), provided specific
provisions with respect to GIs for cheeses. 45
However, none of these agreements had a global significance
comparable to TRIPS regarding GI protection. The Paris
40. See discussion infra Part V.
41. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 14, arts. 22(1)-(3), 23(1), (4), 24(1); see also Hughes,
supra note 9, at 301 (discussing how protection for GIs in TRIPS introduced GIs as the
subject of broad-based multilateral agreements for the first time).
42. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as
revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
43. Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False and Deceptive Indications of
Source on Goods, Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Madrid Agreement].
44. Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their
International Registration, Oct. 31, 1958, as revised July 14, 1967, 923 U.N.T.S. 205
[hereinafter Lisbon Agreement].
45. International Convention on the Use of Designations of Origin and Names for
Cheeses, June 1, 1951, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [JO.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 11, 1952, p. 5821.
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Convention offers protection against the use of false or deceptive
names used in the course of trade,46 and protection when a use is
"liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing
process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or the
quantity, of the goods." 47 Still, the protection offered by the Paris
Convention is limited to acts of unfair competition and not
specifically tailored to GIs. 4 8 The Madrid Agreement and the
Lisbon Agreement offer more extensive and specific protection to
GIs.49 The Lisbon Agreement includes the creation of a system of
international registration for appellations of origin.50 However,
both the Madrid Agreement and the Lisbon Agreement have few
signatories,51 and hence a limited international impact. In May
2015, a Diplomatic Conference was held to review the Lisbon
Agreement under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) and a revised text, the Geneva Act, was
adopted. 52 Still, this revised text may not lead to a significant
increase in the membership of the Lisbon Agreement due to the
continuing division on the issue between WIPO members from the
"New World" and "Old World."53 The Stresa Convention is even
narrower in scope and has less than ten signatories.
Compared with these predecessors, the impact of TRIPS's GI
provisions has been much wider. Notably, TRIPS provides both a
general floor of protection for all GIs against unfair competition
46. Paris Convention, supra note 42, art. 10(1).
47. Id. art. 10bis(3).
48. See id. art. 10bis.
49. See Lisbon Agreement, supra note 44, arts. 1-6; Madrid Agreement, supra note
43, arts. 1, 3-3bis.
50. Lisbon Agreement, supra note 44, art. 5.
51. As of October 2015, only thirty-six states are signatories of the Madrid
Agreement. See Contracting Parties, Madrid Agreement, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang-en&treaty-id=3 (last visited Nov.
20, 2015). Only twenty-eight states are signatories to the Lisbon Agreement. See
Contracting Parties, Lisbon Agreement, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int
/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang-en&treaty-id=10 (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
52. A diplomatic conference was convened in Geneva, Switzerland, in May 2015 to
review the Lisbon Agreement. This continued the efforts by GI supporters to raise attention
to GI protection and secure additional protection for GIs (also) at the multilateral level. See
Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a New Act of the Lisbon Agreement for the
Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International Registration, WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/meetingslen/details.jsp?meeting-id=35202 [hereinafter,
Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement] (last visited Nov. 20, 2015); Daniel Gervais,
Irreconcilable Differences? The Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement and the Common Law,
53 Hous. L. REV. 339 (2015).
53. See Compilation of Proposals by WIPO Member States for Amendments to the
Basic Proposal for the New Act of the Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin and
Geographical Indications, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Mar. 3, 2015),
http://www.wipo.intledocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/li-dc/li-dc_7.pdf.
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and enhanced protection for GIs identifying wines and spirits. 54 In
particular, Article 22 of TRIPS mandates that all WTO members
implement provisions directed at protecting GIs against uses that
could "misleadl the public as to the geographical origin of the
good[s]" identified by GIs or that "constitute[] an act of unfair
competition within the meaning of Article 10bis of the Paris
Convention."55 Still, TRIPS does not mandate the means through
which WTO members have to implement this protection, and
individual countries remain free to turn to their preferred
system-for example, a sui generis rights system like in the EU or
a certification and collective trademarks system like in the U.S.56
TRIPS also leaves countries free to resolve any potential conflicts
between geographical names and existing trademark rights in
their respective jurisdictions in different ways.57 In particular,
WTO members could decide to follow either the principle of "first
in time, first in right" like in the U.S., or a system in which GIs
are superior rights to trademarks and in which similar marks may
be cancelled like in the EU. In this respect, TRIPS "grandfathers
in" some existing trademarks, but only marks that were used,
applied for, or registered in good faith in a WTO member country,
as long as such use, application, or registration: (a) predates
TRIPS's implementation in the WTO member country where the
marks were used, applied for, or registered; or (b) predates the
protection of the GIs at issue in the respective country of origin.58
Still, Article 24(6) of TRIPS states that terms which are
deemed to be generic in a WTO country could continue to be used
as generic terms in that country, 59 unless otherwise agreed upon
by the country itself-for example, via FTAs. These names include
many of the EU names that are hotly contested in the TTIP, such
as "Feta," "Gouda," "Asiago," and "Fontina." As I note in Part V,
the EU has successfully clawed-back several other names,
54. See TRIPS, supra note 14, arts. 22-23.
55. Id. art. 22(2).
56. See id. ("[Member countries] shall provide the legal means for interested parties
to prevent [prohibited uses]."); see also discussion infra Part III (examining the "means" of
implementations used by the EU and the U.S.).
57. Article 22(3) of TRIPS requires that WTO members "refuse or invalidate the
registration of a trademark which contains or consists of a geographical indication with
respect to goods not originating in the territory" when the use of the GI can "mislead the
public as to the true place of origin." TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 22(3). But see id. art. 24(5)-
(6) (providing exceptions to this requirement).
58. Id. art. 24(5). In addition, TRIPS grandfathers pre-existing use of the same names
in different regions of the world and also with respect to GIs "of another Member identifying
wines or spirits in connection with goods and services" where the names have been used
continuously for at least ten years prior to April 15, 1994, or where this use has been in
good faith. Id. art. 24(4).
59. Id. art. 24(6).
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particularly GIs for wines, with ad hoc agreements with several
countries, including the U.S. This strategy has been loudly
opposed and criticized by opponents of GI protection. 60
In addition to the floor protection for all GIs provided for in
Article 22 of TRIPS, Article 23 establishes a system of enhanced
protection for GIs related to wines and spirits. Notably, Article 23
prohibits any use of GIs identifying wines and spirits when the
products do not "originat[e] in the place indicated by the
geographical indication," regardless of whether the use of the GIs
can mislead the public as to the geographical origin of the
products.61 This includes instances when "the true origin of the
goods is indicated" on the products (in addition to the GIs) or when
"the [GI] is used in translation or accompanied by expressions such
as 'kind[,'] 'type[,'] 'style[,'] 'imitation' or the like." 6 2 The fact that
TRIPS members from both the "Old World" and "New World"
camps have considerable interests in the wine and spirit
industries-as shown in Part III with respect to the U.S.-has
undoubtedly contributed to the double standard accepted under
TRIPS, which explicitly favors GIs identifying wines and spirits
against other types of GIs. With respect to GIs for wines and
spirits, however, TRIPS does not mandate that WTO members
recognize GIs over existing registered trademarks. 63 More
specifically, Article 23(2) provides that members may refuse or
invalidate trademark registrations containing or consisting of GIs
identifying wines or spirits, including instances where the use of
the mark does not create confusion for consumers in the
marketplace. 64 The ongoing multinational legal war between
Anheuser-Busch and Budbjovicky Budvar, over the use of the
name "Budweiser" to identify their respective beer products, is one
of the most famous examples in this respect.65 Still, the
implementation of this provision remains optional, and WTO
members can again choose to resolve conflicts between GIs identifying
wines or spirits and trademarks based on the "first in time, first in
right" principle like in the U.S. and several other countries.
60. See discussion infra Part V; see also Agreement Between the European
Community and the United States of America on Trade in Wine, E.C.-U.S., Mar. 10, 2006,
2006 O.J. (L 87) 2 (EC), http://ttb.gov/agreements/us-eu-wine-agreement.pdf [hereinafter
2006 Wine Agreement]; infra notes 79-81 (referencing FTAs negotiated by the EU and
other countries).
61. TRIPS supra note 14, art. 23(1).
62. Id.
63. See id. arts. 23(2), 24(5).
64. Id. art. 23(2).
65. See Christopher Heath, The Budweiser Cases: A Brewing Conflict, in LANDMARK
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES AND THEIR LEGACY 181 (Christopher Heath & Anselm
Kamperman Sanders eds., 2011).
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Besides these two layers of protection, TRIPS
comprehensively defines what constitutes a "GI" within the
meaning of TRIPS. Article 22 states that GIs are "indications
which identify a good as originating in the territory ... or a region
or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or
other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its
geographical origin."66 As I noted in another article, this definition
is considerably broader than the original definition of "appellation
of origins" in the Lisbon Agreement.67 In particular, the definition
in Article 22 of TRIPS includes the concept of "reputation" as an
element qualifying for GI protection in addition to the qualities or
characteristics of a product.68 It also permits a product's quality,
reputation, or other characteristics to be "essentially"
attributable-rather than "exclusively" attributable-to the
GI-denominated terroir. In comparison, under the original
definition in the Lisbon Agreement, protected appellations of
origin should "exclusively or essentially" originate from the
relevant geographical area.69 Yet, the 2015 Geneva Act revisions
of the Lisbon Agreement also include a definition of "geographical
indications" origin similar to the definition in TRIPS. Namely, the
Geneva Act includes the concept of "reputation" in the new
definition and requires that "the quality, reputation or other
characteristic of the good" are only "essentially attributable" to the
relevant geographical area.70
66. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 22(1).
67. Prior to TRIPS, the Lisbon Agreement defined "appellations of origin" as the
"geographical name [s] of a country, region, or locality, which serve[ to designate a product
originating therein, the quality and characteristics of which are due exclusively or
essentially to the geographical environment, including natural and human factors." Lisbon
Agreement, supra note 44, art. 2(1); see Calboli, In Territorio Veritas, supra note 19, at 61-
62 (criticizing the shift towards a less strict link with the territory in TRIPS compared to
the Lisbon Agreement).
68. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 22(1); see GANGJEE, RELOCATING GIS, supra note 12,
at 214 ("[A] number of countries now use the TRIPS definition as the basis for their national
legislation on geographical indications, thus establishing it as a common denominator in
this field of law." (quoting Standing Comm. on the Law of Trademarks, Indus. Designs and
Geographical Indications, 9th Sess., The Definition of Geographical Indications, at 2-3, WIPO
Doc. SCT19/4 (Oct. 1, 2002))); see also Calboli, In Territorio Veritas, supra note 19, at 61.
69. Lisbon Agreement, supra note 44, art. 2(1).
70. The revised text of Article 2(1) of the Lisbon Agreement includes a differentiation
between the following types of GIs: i) geographical "denominations," which "designate a
good as originating in that geographical area, where the quality or characteristics of the
good are due exclusively or essentially to the geographical environment, including natural
and human factors, and which has given the good its reputation;" and ii) geographical
"indications," those "consisting of or containing the name of a geographical area, or another
indication known as referring to such area, which identifies a good as originating in that
geographical area, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is
essentially attributable to its geographical origin." See Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement,
supra note 52, art. 2(1)(i), (ii) (emphasis added).
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Ultimately, as I criticize in Part IV, this loose(r) definition of
"territorial linkage" between the products and GI-denominated
regions allows GI producers to partially "de-territorialize" the
production of GI-denominated products-and thus take advantage
of decreasing tariffs in an increasingly "free" trade-based global
marketplace. This, in turn, may allow producers to increase
product quantity and perhaps save costs on raw materials and
labor compared to the costs of having to produce locally.71 Yet, this
partial "delocalization" runs against the very rationale for GI
protection-the linkage between the products and the terroir72 -
despite the fact that supporters of this expansion claim that it is
the "human factor" (the key local factor) that defines the
authenticity of the GI-denominated products more so than the
products' ingredients and raw materials.73
Finally, TRIPS mandates the continuation of multilateral
discussion over GI protection with the opportunity to increase
protection across WTO member countries. 74 WTO members also
committed to considering a multilateral system of notification and
registration of GIs for wines and spirits.75 In an attempt to
advance TRIPS's built-in GI agenda, discussions on GI protection
were introduced in 2001 as an action item pursuant to the agenda
of the Doha Development Round under the Doha Ministerial
71. See infra notes 158-68 (arguing that a looser definition of "territorial linkage"
transforms GI protection into a disguised barrier, an exclusive right to use and evoke not
fully accurate geographical names, and that a stricter definition does not prevent
competition, but instead promotes creativity in the marketplace and provides accurate
information to consumers).
72. See Calboli, In Territorio Veritas, supra note 19, at 63-66 (stating that the
"geographical link" is the very essence of GIs and the sole reason GIs need protection); see
also Michelle Agdomar, Note, Removing the Greek from Feta and Adding Korbel to
Champagne: The Paradox of Geographical Indications in International Law, 18 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 541, 572 (2008). ("Members of the old world justify their
desire to recognize the link between region and product in the notion of terroir."); Margaret
Ritzert, Note, Champagne is from Champagne: An Economic Justification for Extending
Trademark-Level Protection to Wine-Related Geographical Indicators, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 191,
212-20 (2009).
73. See Delphine Marie-Vivienne, The Protection of Geographical Indications for
Handicrafts: How to Apply the Concepts of Natural and Human Factors to All Products, 4
WIPO J. 191, 197, 199 (2013) (highlighting the role of human factors in GIs identifying
handicrafts and reviewing the existing academic debate on the issue). Commentators have
also supported that the concept of terroir is not exclusively a geographical (in terms of
territorially based) concept, and that tradition and human factor should be equally weighed
in the definition of terroir, and in turn legal protection of GIs. See GANGJEE, RELOCATING
GIS, supra note 12, at 83-93 (reviewing several different views on the interpretation of the
concept of terroir).
74. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 24(1).
75. Id. art. 23(4); see also Justin M. Waggoner, Note, Acquiring a European Taste for
Geographical Indications, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 569, 578 (2008) (noting that TRIPS requires
members to negotiate a multilateral system of notification and registration for GIs and how
to establish it).
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Declaration. 76 The agenda hoped to reach a consensus on the
creation of a multilateral registry for GIs of wines and spirits (and
possibly for all GIs) as well as the extension of enhanced GI
protection by the end of 2003.77 However, no agreement on these
items was reached at the October 2003 WTO meetings in Cancun.
Rather, parties on the opposite side of the debate disagreed so
passionately about the issue that the multilateral GI negotiations
have been gridlocked ever since.78
Because of the difficulty in reaching an agreement at the
multilateral level, supporters of enhanced GI protection (primarily
the EU) have started a one-to-one approach in order to convince
other countries to accept an enhanced protection of GIs. For
instance, the EU introduced GIs as an item for discussion in the
FTAs that the EU has concluded with, inter alia, Peru, Colombia,
Canada, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.79 Provisions on
GIs are also part of the current negotiations between the EU and,
inter alia, India, Malaysia, and Japan.80 The EU has additionally
discussed GI protection in the stand-alone agreement on GIs
between the EU and China.81 In these various fora, the EU has
76. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO
Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, T 18 [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. For a detailed analysis of
the Doha Declaration, see TRIPS: Issues, Geographical Indications, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://wto.org/english/tratop.e/trips e/gie.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
77. See Doha Declaration, supra note 76, ¶ 18.
78. For more details, see TRIPS: Geographical Indications, Background and the
Current Situation, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e
/gi background_e.htm (last updated Nov. 2008); see also General Council for the Trade
Negotiations Committee, Issues Related to the Extension of the Protection of Geographical
Indications Provided for in Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement to Products Other than Wines
and Spirits and Those Related to the Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the
Convention on Biological Diversity, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/633 (Apr. 21, 2011),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/chairtextsl1_e/dg..trips-e.doc (confirming
WTO members' diverging positions).
79. See EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, EU-Viet., Aug. 5, 2015,
http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2015/august/tradoc_153674.pdf; CETA, Intellectual
Property Chapter, supra note 25, $ 41; EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, EU-Sing.,
Sept. 20, 2013, http://ec.europa.eultrade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/singapore/;
EU-Colombia-Peru Free Trade Agreement, Colom.-EU-Peru, June 26, 2012,
http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclibhtml/147704.htm; EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement,
EU-S. Kor., Sept. 16, 2010, 54 O.J. (L 127) 1, 46-47, http://eur-lex.europa.eulegal
-content/en/ALL/?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:TOC. In July 2014, negotiations were concluded for
the accession of Ecuador to the Trade Agreement between the EU, Colombia, and Peru. See
EU and Ecuador Publish Text of Trade Agreement, EUR. COMMISSION (Sept. 23, 2014),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=l 156.
80. For details on the FTAs currently negotiated by the EU, see
Geographical-Indications, supra note 8; Countries and Regions, EUR. COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eultrade/policy/countries-and-regions/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
81. See EU-China Geographical Indications - "10 plus 10"Project Is Now Completed,
EUR. COMMISSION (Nov. 30, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release-IP-12-1297_en.htm
(discussing the pilot program between the EU and China and listing the ten GIs to which
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succeeded in advancing its requests by exchanging other trade
concessions with the negotiating parties.82 Similarly, opponents of
enhanced GI protection-especially the U.S., Australia, and New
Zealand-have promoted their anti-GI agenda as part of FTA
negotiations. For example, GI-related provisions in favor of the
principle of "first in time, first in right" have been adopted in the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)-a plurilateral agreement
between the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Chile, Australia, New Zealand,
and several other countries in the Pacific region, including
Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.83 Despite opposition in many
countries, including the U.S.,84 the TPP was finalized in October
2015. However, the final text of the TPP does not forbid individual
TPP members from implementing enhanced GI protection.85
Moreover, several TPP member countries are simultaneously
negotiating, or have recently concluded, FTAs with the EU, in
which they accept, at least in part, the EU's requests to claw-back
certain terms. 86 Not surprisingly, these multilayers levels of
negotiations have further complicated TTIP negotiations and
added to U.S. resentment for each point the EU has scored in FTAs
with foreign countries.
III. UNMASKING THE TRUTH: IS THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES JUST MARKET
ACCESS?
In this Part, I outline the current system of GI protection in
the EU and the U.S. and note that, despite the claims of
irreconcilable differences, the two systems are closer than what
both sides committed to register and protect); Geographical Indications, EU-CHINA TRADE
PROJECT (II), http://www.euctp.org/index.php/en/agriculture-food-safety/geographical
-indications-gi.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) (supporting GI registration in the EU and
China).
82. Geographical-Indications, supra note 8 (stating that the EU has concluded
multiple FTAs that contain important GI protections).
83. See, e.g., TPP, Intellectual Property Chapter, supra note 24, arts. 18.30-18.36.
84. See, e.g., Margot E. Kamisky, Don't Keep the Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks
Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2015, at A23 (stating that the secrecy of the negotiations have
led other countries to press for more transparency); Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/tpp (last visited Nov. 20, 2015)
(arguing that the TPP risks certain fundamental rights that are due to citizens).
85. See TPP, Intellectual Property Chapter, supra note 24, art. 18.36 (coordinating
GI-related obligations to which TPP members must adhere under the TPP and other
international agreements).
86. Such member countries include Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Singapore
and Vietnam have recently concluded FTAs with the EU. See EU-Vietnam Free Trade
Agreement, supra note 79; EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, supra note 79. And
Malaysia is currently negotiating its FTA with the EU. See Countries and Regions, supra
note 80.
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both camps contend. This statement is directly supported by the
fact that both the U.S. and the EU protect certain types of GIs-
specifically the appellations of origin for wines-with sui generis
protection. In particular, I demonstrate that, rather than an
ideological controversy, the GI debate is primarily a controversy
about market access, namely a fight for market shares between
EU and U.S. products in their respective national markets and
internationally.
Notably, the EU protects GIs through a system of EU-wide
registration, which includes EU GIs as well as non-EU GIs that
comply with necessary requirements. Once registered in the EU,
GIs are protected in the territory of EU member states. 7 The EU
system of GI protection originates in the law of several EU
member states, which already protected appellations or
denominations of geographical origin before the adoption of
EU-wide laws-for example, Italy, France, and Spain.88 To date,
GI protection in the EU is still limited to GIs identifying
agricultural-related products-foodstuff and products derived
from the soil-as well as GIs identifying wines and spirits.89
However, at the time this Article goes to press, the EU is
considering expanding GI protection to artifacts and artisanal
products.90 If this expansion of GI protection would be approved
87. See sources cited infra notes 91-93.
88. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 9, at 306-07 (discussing French law that was the
first to combat fraudulently labeled wines). For the current national laws on GIs in France,
Italy, and Spain, see the database organized and managed by the WIPO including all
national laws of WIPO Members States on GIs, WIPO Lex, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
89. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 91-93 (limiting their scope of application to
products intended for human consumption).
90. On January 20, 2015, the European Commission published a report
examining the preliminary results of a public consultation evaluating the opportunity
to extend GI protection for non-agricultural products. See Results of the Public
Consultation and Public Conference on Making the Most Out of Europe's Traditional
Know-How: A Possible Extension of Geographical Indication Protection of the European
Union to Non-Agricultural Products, at 36-37, COM (2014) 469 final (Jan. 20, 2015),
http://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/10565/attachments/1/translations/en/renditio
ns/pdf (finding strong support for application of GIs to non-agricultural products while
questioning whether the system should resemble the existing EU GI protection of
agricultural products). This report followed a study on the topic commissioned by the
EU Commission. See Insight Consulting et al., Study on Geographical Indications
Protection for Non-Agricultural Products in the Internal Market (2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/indprop/docs/geo -indications/130322_geo-indicati
ons-non-agri-study-en.pdf. On September 22, 2015, the European Parliament also
considered the issue in a plenary session following the opinions of several of its
committee, and called "on the Commission to propose without delay a legislative
proposal with the aim of establishing a single European system of protection of
geographical indications for non-agricultural products." Comm. on Legal Affairs,
Report on the Possible Extension of Geographical Indication Protection of the European
Union to Non-Agricultural Products, EU Doc. A8-0259/2015, at 6/26 1 3 (2015),
2015] TIME TO SAY LOCAL CHEESE 391
(or rather when it will be approved considering the strong internal
support in the EU), the existing protection for GIs would extend to
non-agricultural products qualifying for protection in the EU. This
would include EU-based non-agricultural GIs (for example,
Bohemia crystal and Murano glass) and non-EU-based GIs
complying with registration requirements.
Still, to date, the following EU Regulations establish the
existing system of GI protection, which is exclusively focused on
agricultural goods, foodstuff, wines, and spirits. These regulations
have been amended and updated in the past two decades and
today are: Council Regulation (EU) No. 1151/2012 (Agricultural
Products and Foodstuff Regulation), 91 Council Regulation (EC) No.
479/2008 (Wine Regulation), 92 and Council Regulation (EC) No.
119/2008 (Spirits Regulation).93 Under these regulations, the EU
protects two separate types of GIs, which nonetheless enjoy the
same level of protection across all EU Member States. These two
distinct types of GIs are: "designation of origin" (PDOs) and
"geographical indication" (PGIs), 94 which differ based on their
respective linkage between the products that they identify and the
geographical areas from which the products originate. In
particular, PDOs are types of GIs that identify products produced
entirely in the relevant geographical area,95 even though some
limited exceptions apply with respect to certain products in
specific PDO cases. 96 On the other hand, PGIs are GIs that are
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-
2015-0259+0+DOC+PDF+VO//EN.
91. Regulation 1151/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of Nov. 21,
2012 on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and Foodstuff, 2012 O.J. (L 343) 1
[hereinafter EU Agricultural Products and Foodstuff Regulation].
92. Council Regulation 479/2008 of Apr. 29, 2008 on the Common Organization of the
Market in Wine, Amending Regulations 1493/1999, 1782/2003, 1290/2005, 3/2008 and
Repealing Regulations (EEC) 2392/86 and 1493/1999, 2008 O.J. (L 148) 1 [hereinafter EU
Wine Regulation].
93. Regulation 110/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of Jan. 15,
2008 on the Definition, Description, Presentation, Labeling and the Protection of
Geographical Indications of Spirits Drinks and Repealing Council Regulation (EEC)
1576/89, 2008 O.J. (L 39) 16 [hereinafter EU Spirits Regulation].
94. See EU Agricultural Products and Foodstuff Regulation, supra note 91; EU Wine
Regulation, supra note 92, art. 34(2), at 18.
95. EU Agricultural Products and Foodstuff Regulation, supra note 91, art. 5(1),
at 8; EU Wine Regulation, supra note 92, art. 34(1)(a), at 17. In addition, Article 34(2)
of the EU Wine Regulation includes in the definition of "designation" certain
"traditionally used names" provided that they "a) designate a wine; b) refer to a
geographical name; c) meet the requirements referred to in paragraph 1(a)(i) to (iv) [of
Article 34(1)(a)]; [and] d) undergo the [relevant] procedure conferring protection on
designations of origin and geographical indications." EU Wine Regulation, supra note
92, art. 34(2), at 18.
96. See EU Agricultural Products and Foodstuff Regulation, supra note 91, art. 5(3),
at 8-9. For example, the specification of the PDO "Prosciutto di Parma" permits that the
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used to identify products that "(a) originat[e] in a specific place,
region or country; (b) whose given quality, reputation or other
characteristic is essentially attributable to its geographical origin;
and (c) at least one of the production steps of which take place in
the defined geographical area." 9 7 In other words, PGIs are names
that do not guarantee a product's origination entirely from a
particular geographical area.
Both the Agricultural Products and Foodstuff Regulation as
well as the Wine Regulation protect PDOs and PGIs. In
comparison, the Spirits Regulation only protects PGIs.98
Applications for both PDOs and PGIs for products located in a
geographical area in an EU Member's State are first submitted to,
and approved by, the relevant national authorities of that EU
Member State. Once the national stage of the application has been
completed, the application is submitted to the EU Commission-
specifically, the Directorate-General for Agriculture, the authority
in charge of registering PDOs and PGIs. Each application includes
a detailed specification of the GI-denominated product for which
the application is filed, the relevant geographical area where the
products are made, the proof of the link between the
GI-denominated products and the geographical area, and the
authorities that are in charge of supervising the compliance of the
quality of the GI-denominated products with the quality
requirements listed in the specification.99 Once received by the
Commission, the application is published and can be opposed for a
period of three months. Once registered, both PDOs and PGIs are
protected against any use of the terms with respect to similar
products, 100 as well as against evocative, descriptive, and
pigs used for the final products, the Parma ham, originate from outside the Parma region,
precisely from eleven different regions of Italy. Notably, "[t]he raw material comes from a
geographical area that is larger than the production area, and which includes the
administrative districts of the following Italian Regions: Emilia-Romagna, Veneto,
Lombardy, Piedmont, Molise, Umbria, Tuscany, Marche, Abruzzo and Lazio (Italy)." See
Specification and Dossier Pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation 2081/92 of 14 July
1992 on the Protection of Geographical Indications and Designations of Origin for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 1, http://www.prosciuttodi
parma.com/pdf/enUK/disciplinare.28.11.2013.en.pdf.
97. EU Agricultural Products and Foodstuff Regulation, supra note 91, art. 5(2), at
8; see EU Wine Regulation, supra note 92, art. 34(1)(b), at 18 (establishing comparable
requirements for wine PGIs).
98. See EU Spirits Regulation, supra note 93, art. 15, at 21 (referring only to
geographical indications and making no reference to designations of origins).
99. See EU Agricultural Products and Foodstuff Regulation, supra note 91, arts. 7-
11, at 9-11; EU Wine Regulation, supra note 92, arts. 35-41, at 18-20; EU Spirits
Regulation, supra note 93, art. 17, at 22.
100. For example, the GI "Aceto Balsamico di Modena" is protected against the use
of the name Modena with respect to any aceto balsamico (balsamic vinegar) products. See
Commission Regulation 583/2009 of July 3, 2009, Entering a Name in the Register of
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comparative uses of the GIs. This includes protection against
instances where the terms are accompanied by expressions such
as "style," "type," "method," "as produced in," "imitation," and the
like, as well as the use of GIs in translations.101
On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. protects GIs
primarily under its trademark system, primarily as certification
and collective trademarks.1 02 To a large extent, these marks offer
a system of protection similar to a sui generis GI regime, even
though critics of this system support that only a sui generis system
can guarantee a sufficiently thorough system of registration and
certification of GIs. Still, similar to sui generis GIs, neither
collective nor certification marks can be owned by private owners,
but instead must be owned and managed by a specific entity or
group. 103 In particular, certification marks are generally owned by
a standards-setting or certification entity, which allows a group of
producers to use the mark as long as they meet certain standards
of product quality and, in this case, geographical origin. 104
Well-known examples of registered U.S. geographical certification
marks from the U.S. and the EU include "Grown in Idaho" for
potatoes,105 "Florida" for citrus fruit and juices, 06 "Roquefort" for
Protected Designations of Origin and Protected Geographical Indications [Aceto
Balsamico di Modena (PGI)], 2009 O.J. (L 175) 7.
101. EU Agricultural Products and Foodstuff Regulation, supra note 91, art. 13, at 11;
EU Wine Regulation, supra note 92, art. 45, at 21; EU Spirits Regulation, supra note 93,
art. 16, at 22.
102. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). For a detailed summary of the GI
controversy and GI regulation in the U.S., see 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 14:1-1.50 (4th ed. 2015); see also Stacey D.
Goldberg, Comment, Who Will Raise the White Flag? The Battle Between the United States
and the European Union over the Protection of Geographical Indications, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L
EcON. L. 107, 135-39 (2001) (outlining the current debate between the U.S. and the EU
over geographical indications); Peter Harvey, Geographical Indications: The United States
Perspective (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the history,
economics, and politics underlying the U.S. position on GIs). For the changes in U.S.
trademark law with respect to the protection of geographical marks, see generally Robert
Brauneis & Roger E. Schechter, Geographic Trademarks and the Protection of Competitor
Communication, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 782 (2006) (discussing the various changes in U.S.
trademark law from 1905 to the present day); Mary LaFrance, Innovations Palpitations:
The Confusing Status of Geographically Misdescriptive Trademarks, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
125 (2004) (examining the amendments to the Lanham Act that occurred after the
execution of GATT and NAFTA).
103. See Eleanor Meltzer, Worldwide Symposium on Geographical Indications,
Geographical Indications and Trademarks: Intellectual Property Any Way You Slice It,
WIPO Doc. GEO/SFO/03/3, at 11-13 (June 30, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/edocs
/mdocs/geoindlen/wipo-geosfo_03/wipo-geo sfo-03-3-main1.pdf [hereinafter Meltzer,
Geographical Indications and Trademarks].
104. Id.
105. GROWN IN IDAHO, Registration No. 2,914,307.
106. FLORIDA, Registration No. 1,200,770.
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cheese,107 and "Parma" for hams.108 In addition to registered
certification marks, the U.S. recognizes that certification marks
can be protected under the common law-that is, when these
designations are used in commerce but not registered. 109 Collective
marks, on the other hand, are generally owned by collective
associations (not standards-setting or certification entities) that
generally do not sell goods, but rather promote the goods sold by
their members.110 Members.of collective associations can use the
group mark in addition to their individual marks to identify their
products.
But the U.S. does not protect GIs only under its trademark
system. Perhaps unknown to many, the U.S. provides additional
sui generis protection to GIs identifying appellations of origin for
wine. U.S. laws provide this protection both at the federal and
state levels.
At the federal level, the Treasury Department's Alcohol and
Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB)-until 2003, the same
function was performed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms 111-grants applicants the permission to indicate that a
certain wine originates from a particular geographical area of the
U.S.112 As part of the application process for appellations for wine,
applicants also have to indicate that the wines meet specific
requirements. In particular, the geographical areas that can be
covered by appellations of origin for wines include the entire U.S.,
no more than three states which have contiguous boundaries, a
single state, a county, or a location established by a "viticultural
area." 13 To date, the TTB has approved over 130 viticultural areas
107. ROQUEFORT, Registration No. 571,798.
108. PARMA, Registration No. 2,014,627.
109. Famous disputes granting common law rights in the U.S. involve the terms
"Cognac" and "Darjeeling." See Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1881, 1888-96 (T.T.A.B. 2006); Inst. Nat'l Des Appellations d'Origine v. Brown-Forman
Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1875, 1885-86 (T.T.A.B. 1998); see also Daniel Gervais, A
Cognac After a Spanish Champagne? Geographical Indications as Certification Marks, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 130 (Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014). Still, U.S. courts found the term "Fontina"
and "Chablis" to be generic. See Institut Nat'l Des Appellations D'Origine v. Vintners Int'l
Co., 958 F.2d 1574, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Cooperativa Produttori Latte E Fontina
Valle D'Aosta, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 131, 134 (T.T.A.B. 1986).
110. Meltzer, Geographical Indications and Trademarks, supra note 103, at 11.
111. See 6 U.S.C. § 531(c)(2), (d) (2012).
112. 27 U.S.C. § 205; 27 C.F.R. § 4.25 (2015); see 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 102,
§ 14:19.50, at 14-69 to -70 (reconstructing the history of protection of appellations of origin
for wine in the U.S.); see also Michael Maher, Comment, On Vino Veritas? Clarifying the
Use of Geographic References on American Wine Labels, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1881, 1887-99
(2001).
113. 27 C.F.R. § 4.25(a)(1); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 14:19.50, at 14-70.
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in thirty-two states. 114 In addition, federal regulations (similar to
the Wine Regulation with respect to EU PGIs for wines) require
that at least 75% of local grapes be used in order to label a wine
with the name of the respective U.S. locality."' Still, a loophole
allows marks in use before 1986 employing the geographical name
to continue to be used on wines that utilize less than 75% of local
grapes, so long as the label of the wine discloses the true source of
the grapes. 16 However, states like California have passed ad hoc
legislation against this loophole. In particular, California
legislated that the terms "Napa" and "Sonoma" could not be used
in association with wines not following the 75% local grapes
rule.11 7 Interestingly, these measures safeguard the quality of
U.S.-denominated wines against the possible dilution that could
be derived from subpar, and less authentic, products-which is the
same concern expressed by the EU against U.S. use of EU GIs.
This sui generis protection for appellation of origin for wines
is also directly administered at the state level. To date, several
states have adopted ad hoc regulations on the use of geographic
names for wines.118 These regulations require that producers in
the relevant wine regions use the region names to identify their
wines. Notably, some states adopt stricter regulations than others
with respect to the percentage of local grapes that need to be used
by wine-makers to lawfully use the appellations for wine."q9
114. See Wine Appellations of Origin, ALCOHOL & TOBACCO TAX & TRADE BUREAU,
http://www.ttb.gov/appellation/index.shtml (last updated Oct. 16, 2015).
115. 27 C.F.R § 4.25(b)(1). There are higher percentage requirements, however, in the
case of multi-state, multi-county, and viticultural area appellations of origin. To meet the
requirements for a multi-state appellation of origin, 100% of the grapes (or any other
agricultural input) for the wine must be grown in the states on the label. In addition, the
wine must be fully finished in one of the labeled states, and the percentage of grapes used
from each state must be displayed on the label. See Wine Appellations of Origin, supra note
114. To qualify for a multi-country appellation of origin, 100% of the grapes composing the
wine must be from the labeled counties of a single state, and the percentage of wine derived
from grapes from each county must be indicated on the label. Id. The requirements for a
viticultural appellation of origin are: (1) not less than 85% of the wine's volume is derived
from grapes grown in the labeled viticultural area, (2) the wine is fully finished in one of
the states in which the viticultural area is located, and (3) the labeled area is an American
viticultural area approved under U.S. regulations. Id.
116. 2 McCARTHY, supra note 102, § 14:19.50, at 14-72.
117. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25241 (West 2015) (regarding the term "Napa");
id. § 25242(b) (regarding the term "Sonoma"); see also id. § 25246(a) (stating that
wineries in designated areas of Sonoma County must add "Sonoma County" to their
labels).
118. See Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 440-41 (Cal. 2004); Maher, supra note
112, at 1913-14.
119. For example, to qualify for the appellation of origin "California," California
law requires that 100% of the wine's volume be derived from grapes within California.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 17015 (2015). Oregon requires that 95% of grapes used in
the production of wine labeled "Oregon," the name of only Oregon counties, or the name
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Accordingly, despite the emotional rhetoric on the topic, it is fair
to say that the EU and the U.S. do not diverge so radically on their
views of GI protection, regardless of what the pro- and anti-GI camps
may otherwise say.1 20 Instead, the views of the U.S. and the EU are
remarkably similar when their respective national interests align, as
in the case of GIs for wine.121 In contrast, the EU and the U.S. views
on GIs diverge sharply when their respective national interests do not
align, like in the current case of names regarding cheese or cured meat
products.1 2 2 In these cases, U.S. producers (and politicians) oppose the
protection of EU GIs in the U.S., fearing that such protection will
undermine national interests and the sales of domestic products. 123 As
alluded to earlier, however, this opposition rests primarily on reasons
related to market access-that is, fear of an immediate loss of market
share due to the costs of relabeling U.S. products and the deeper
concern of losing long-term market share. Notably, U.S. producers fear
that, due to the additional information that GIs offer to consumers,
better informed consumers could decide to switch from the U.S.-made
version of European cheeses and meats to products made in the
EUl24-in turn this would affect the sales of U.S. products.
The fact that the GI debate is essentially a "trade war"
between the U.S. and the EU is additionally reflected in the EU's
requests to the U.S. to cease the use of EU GIs, even with
of an American Viticultural Area wholly within Oregon be from within the defined
boundaries of that appellation of origin. OR. ADMIN. R. 845-010-0920 (2015).
120. But see Dev Gangjee, Quibbling Siblings: Conflicts Between Trademarks and
Geographical Indications, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1267 (2007) (analyzing the difference
between EU GIs and the U.S.'s preferred method of protection, trademarks); see also
Annette Kur, Quibbling Siblings: Comments to Dev Gangjee's Presentation, 82 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1317, 1321 (2007) (noting skepticism that the informing effects of protected GIs on
consumers actually accomplish the desired result that the EU is seeking, namely to increase
sales of the protected products).
121. See U.S. Dairy Industry Drives Home Concerns on Geographical Indications and
Common Food Name Issues During TTIP Stakeholders Forum, CONSORTIUM FOR COMMON
FOOD NAMES (Feb. 4, 2015), http://commonfoodnames.com/u-s-dairy-industry-drives-home
-concerns-on-geographical-indications-and-common-food-name-issues-during-ttip-stakehol
ders-forum/ (relating the dairy industry opposition to EU pressure for protection of
geographical indications) [hereinafter U.S. Dairy Industry Drives Home Concerns on
Geographical Indications].
122. See id.
123. See Say Bye Bye to Parmesan, Muenster and Feta Europe Wants Its Cheese Back,
supra note 21.
124. To compare with GMO labeling of food products, see Michelle Ye Hee Lee,
Would GMO Labeling Requirement Cost $500 More in Groceries per Family a Year?,
WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/20
15/04/06/would-gmo-labeling-requirement-cost-500-more-in-groceries-per-family-a-year/
(finding that giving consumers knowledge of genetically-modified ingredients could cause
them to not buy those products, forcing companies to switch ingredients to prevent
decreased demand).
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delocalizers such as "type," "like," "style," etc. 125 Obviously,
without strong GI protection, the EU would no longer enjoy the
competitive advantage that EU names (still) seem to command in
the global marketplace for cheese and cured meats due to a long
tradition in manufacturing these products in the EU.1 26
Moreover, despite the finger pointing between the two camps
and claims that the opposite position may result in confusion for
their respective national consumers, both the U.S. and the EU are
ready to accept a considerable degree of "geographical inaccuracy"
when it best suits their respective trade interests, regardless of
the resulting consumer misinformation. Certainly, in a world with
diminishing agricultural subsidies, increased protection for
geographical names (especially when these names are well known
like Chianti, Champagne, Napa, or Sonoma) offers producers in
agriculture-intensive sectors an important alternative to national
subsidies.127 However, when GI protection attaches to products not
entirely originating from the relevant GI-denominated regions,
GIs become a marketing tool for certain producers without a sound
basis for this protection. Moreover, GIs can become vehicles for
consumer confusion and deception. 128 In particular, the EU does
not hesitate to protect PGIs, which identify products that originate
only in part from PGI-denominated regions. 129 Likewise, neither
the U.S. nor the EU formally objects to the fact that, in certain
instances, the percentage of local grapes used for wines labeled as
originating from a specific geographical area is less than 100%.130
Yet, consumers in the EU as much as in the U.S. do rely on the
geographical names of these products as a source of origin, and
most often believe that the origin reflected in these names
125. See Raustiala & Munzer, supra note 12, at 342 (noting that GI protection is a
method for the EU to protect their agricultural sector from external, low-cost competition).
126. See European Comm'n, Final Report on Value of Production of Agricultural
Products and Foodstuffs, Wines, Aromatised Wines and Spirits Protected by a Geographical
Indication (GI) 71 (Oct. 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/external-studies/2012/value
-gilfinal-report-en.pdf (revealing that GI products were sold 2.23 times as high as the same
quantity of non-GI products); EU Geographical Indications Worth About C54 Billion
Worldwide, EUR. COMMIsSION (Apr. 3, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture
/newsroom/106_en.htm (showing the importance of GIs to the EU by revealing that EU GIs
are valued at C54.3 billion worldwide); see also European Commission Press Release
MEMO/13/163, Q&A: European Commission Study on the Value of EU GIs (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-13-163_en.pdf (listing the benefits of GIs for
the producers of protected products).
127. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 9, at 345 (highlighting that the means to gain added
revenue when agricultural subsidies are decreasing is to move toward high-end products
that are controlled in order to "cultivate and maintain consumer demand").
128. See Calboli, Markets, Culture, and Terroir, supra note 19, at 458-59.
129. Hughes, supra note 9, at 324-25 (observing that PGIs have a relaxed terroir
requirement).
130. See 27 C.F.R. § 4.25(b) (2015); EU Wine Regulation, supra note 92, art. 34(1)(b), at 18.
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indicates the actual and accurate geographical origin of the
products as a whole, including their ingredients and various
manufacturing steps.13 1 In addition, consumers frequently
purchase these products precisely because of their geographical
origin, which conveys (or should convey) certain guarantees
regarding product quality and characteristics. 1 32 Many consumers,
including this Author, also want to support local producers, and
rely on GIs as indicators of local places.
Besides accepting these convenient degrees of "geographical
inaccuracy," both the U.S. and the EU are also guilty of inaccurate
"rhetorical exaggerations" as part of the GI debate. Notably, the U.S.
tends to exaggerate the "genericness" of certain (not surprisingly,
foreign) geographical names in their national territory. In this
respect, U.S. producers regularly exaggerate the claims of
"genericness" of EU names in order to avoid the risk of relabeling
their products. 133 Furthermore, U.S. producers-and in turn U.S.
politicians under the pressure of U.S. producers-tend to overstate
the argument that the relabeling of products carrying those names
could lead to consumer confusion, as consumers would suddenly not
recognize the products under new names, or be confused about the
products' origin.1 34 In reality, no convincing evidence has been
collected, as of today, to prove (or disprove) that consumers would
truly be confused if products were relabeled in order to identify their
actual geographical origin. Likewise, it remains unclear and no
evidence indicates that consumers would ultimately care if products
in the U.S. were relabeled, as long as consumers are provided with
accurate information about the products' origin and access to the
same types of products. As I support below, contrary to the claim that
relabeling may lead to confusion, consumers could in fact benefit
from relabeling, as they would have access to more accurate
information about the products they purchase. But the U.S. is not the
only camp liable of exaggerating its claims in the GI debate. On its
side, the EU also exaggerates the possible risk of consumer confusion
131. See Ritzert, supra note 72, at 208.
132. See id. at 195.
133. For example, the U.S. and the EU have battled for decades over the use of the
term "Champagne," and U.S. producers still can use the word "Champagne" as "American
Champagne." The producers of Champagne did not bring claims only against the use of
champagne in the U.S. In 1960, French Champagne producers won their suit against
Spanish sparkling wine producers in the United Kingdom, where the court held that the
producers were allowed to prevent the sale of Champagne. PETER J. GROVES, SOURCEBOOK
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 710, 720 (1997) (citing J. Bollinger v. Costa Brava Wine
Co. Ltd. [1960] 1 All ER 561 as the first recognition of goodwill attaching to "Champagne").
134. See April 2014 Letter from Forty-Five U.S. Senators to Vilsack and Froman,
supra note 1; see also Say Bye Bye to Parmesan, Muenster and Feta: Europe Wants Its
Cheese Back, supra note 21 (quoting Kraft spokesman Basil Maglaris).
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or tarnishment to the reputation of EU products that could occur if
EU GIs are used by U.S. producers with delocalizers such as "type,"
"style," kind," "imitation" or the like.135 The EU also regularly
exaggerates the fears that the use of EU GIs with delocalizers
could lead to the genericide of EU GIs. Here again, no evidence has
ever been gathered to indicate whether consumers would be
confused or EU products would be tarnished so that consumers
would no longer purchase them. Instead, I would argue that
delocalizing terms explicitly clarify that the products do not
originate from GI-denominated regions and provide better
information for consumers. Hence, the current EU position is
primarily focused on maintaining absolute control of EU GIs-no
one shall use EU GIs in any context, including to evoke comparison
with the EU!136 Moreover, denying U.S. competitors the possibility
of using EU GIs to compare or describe generic-type products
amounts to both an unreasonably anticompetitive request and
possibly a violation of the freedom of commercial expression
principle in the U.S.137
In summary, the GI debate within the TTIP negotiations
remains primarily about national trade interests and market
access. Of course, as I have argued in my scholarship, ideological
differences remain important in the GI debate,138 and it is
undeniable that concepts such as "tradition" and "authenticity"-
the core theoretical values of GI protection-are not equally
relevant in both the EU (a continent rooted on tradition) and the
U.S. (a continent rooted on innovation). But again, the story of
U.S. wine protection does show how these concepts can be
important in the U.S. as well, to the point that California has
restricted the ability to use the name "Napa" and "Sonoma" in
order to guarantee the authenticity of these names. More
generally, tradition and authenticity are important concepts also
in the U.S., increasingly so with respect to food and
agricultural-related products.
135. See Hughes, supra note 9, at 381 (positing that consumers would likely not be
confused when a product is labelled with "-style" or "-like").
136. See Kur, supra note 120, at 1321 (commenting that the European regime
prohibits any competitive challenge to a protected GI product either directly or
indirectly).
137. See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text (positing that unlimited GI
protection is an unjustified barrier to entry and conflicts with the U.S. Supreme Court's
test for misleading commercial speech).
138. Calboli, Dolce Vita, supra note 35, at 166-71 (summarizing the various positions
on GIs in the "New World" and the "Old World").
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IV. THE (STILL) RELEVANT ROLE OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS
AS INCENTIVES FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT (ALSO IN THE UNITED
STATES)
As mentioned previously, the controversy that dominates the
current GI debate is unfortunate because it prevents the adoption
of a compromising solution, which is especially desirable
considering the unique economic benefits that GIs can provide for
U.S. producers and consumers. In this Part, I outline these
benefits. I also note that GI protection should nonetheless be
limited in order to avoid unnecessary barriers to competition and
freedom of expression.
The first argument in support of GI protection is that GIs
promote the establishment of GI-denominated local markets
within the general market for type-level products-for example,
Napa or Sonoma as a local market within the general market for
wines. 139 Moreover, not only do GIs promote local markets, they
also generally promote higher quality markets. Based on the U.S.
wine experience, as well as the experience of many EU
GI-denominated products, it is accurate to say that
GI-denominated markets frequently specialize in high-end
products compared to the general markets for type-level
products.1 40 Accordingly, GIs can assist in motivating a group of
regional producers-such as wine-makers from Napa and Sonoma,
and cheese-makers from Wisconsin, Michigan, Vermont, and other
states-to meet, and maintain, particular production standards
originating from the area. In other words, GIs can facilitate first
the establishment and later the conservation of these high(er)
quality markets through geographical names. 14 1 These names
identify the geographical area from which the products originate
and reflect the social capital (and thus the goodwill) that is
invested in the creation and maintenance of the quality of the
products.1 42  Moreover, GIs facilitate the promotion of
GI-denominated products in all markets-at the local, national,
and international level. In this respect, GIs are essential tools for
the promotion of local products in the global market in that they
139. See Ritzert, supra note 72, at 212-20; see also Calboli, Markets, Culture and
Terroir, supra note 19, at 448.
140. Ritzert, supra note 72, at 212-20; see also Calboli, Markets, Culture and Terroir,
supra note 19, at 449-51.
141. See Gangjee, supra note 120, at 1267 (observing that GIs recognize investments
in production methods that have evolved over time to create "specific standards of quality").
142. See GANGJEE, RELOCATING GIS, supra note 12, at 266. ("Since consumers are
willing to pay more for such goods, this encourages farmers to invest in making the
transition from producing undifferentiated bulk commodities towards producing higher
quality niche products.").
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allow producers to capitalize on people's desire to choose products
from a certain region and with certain characteristics 143-in the
U.S., for example, wine from Napa, potatoes from Idaho, bourbon
from Kentucky, cheese from Wisconsin, etc. In summary, GIs
promote the idea of "geographical identity" in the larger context of
global trade and permit producers to promote GI-denominated
products as "originally" and "authentically" originating from a
certain geographical area. 144
To fully capture the value offered by GIs, however, GI
producers need to protect the association that consumers create
between the GI-denominated products and their respective
GI-denominated regions of origin. 145 Accordingly, GI producers
need legal protection against confusing uses of terms identical or
similar to their GIs, lest the consumers could associate confusingly
similar products with their regions. GI producers also need legal
protection against diluting uses of their GIs by unrelated parties
because these uses can affect the association with, and the
143. See Calboli, Markets, Culture and Terroir, supra note 19, at 449-51; see also Jane
Black, The Geography of Flavor, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2007, at F1 (citing products that
take advantage of demand for products from specific regions with specific characteristics);
Jocelyne Fouassier, Promoting Food and Lifestyle: The French Experience, in OECD
STUDIES ON TOURISM, FOOD AND THE TOURISM EXPERIENCE: THE OECD-KOREA WORKSHOP
155, 159 (2012) (asserting that an indication of origin can invoke an idea of quality that
encompasses concrete and abstract elements associated with a geographical location that
cannot be duplicated elsewhere).
144. See Sarah Bowen, Embedding Local Places in Global Spaces: Geographical
Indications as a Territorial Development Strategy, 75 RURAL SOC. 209, 210 (2010)
(recognizing that local producers can benefit from global trade when their products are
connected with the unique characteristics of their region and production practices); see also
Coombe & Aylwin, supra note 12, at 2027-30 (opining that the unique characteristics of the
geographical region should be used in marketing to enable regional producers to compete
in global trade); cf. Margaret Chon, Slow Logo: Brand Citizenship in Global Value
Networks, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 935, 966 (2013) (suggesting that, through increased
transparency, producers in the fashion industry can capitalize on consumer demand for
socially responsible product development). But see Rosemary J. Coombe, Sarah Ives &
Daniel Huizenga, Geographical Indications: The Promise, Perils and Politics of Protecting
Place-Based Products, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 207, 213-15
(Matthew David & Deborah Halbert eds., 2014) (suggesting that the idea of a unified
geographical identity espoused by GIs is more imagined than real); Doris Estelle Long,
Branding the Land: Creating Global Meanings for Local Characteristics, in TRADEMARK
PROTECTION AND TERRITORIALITY CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 100, 103 (Irene
Calboli & Edward Lee eds., 2014) (arguing that the use of geographical designators does
not necessarily assure the development of viable niche markets and that without domestic
laws assuring quality control, the designation may actually contribute to consumer
confusion).
145. See Hughes, supra note 9, at 352-53, 356; Agdomar, supra note 72, at 586-87
(noting that granting property rights through geographical indications allows producers to
control the quality of their goods in order to build consumer confidence). But see Raustiala
& Munzer, supra note 12, at 352-54, 361-64 (critiquing the argument that GIs protect the
valid interests of producers or protect consumers from confusion).
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desirability of, GI-denominated products. 146 Even though uses of
GIs leading to dilution may not be confusing to consumers, these
uses may still severely affect the ability of GI producers to promote
their products in the long term. In particular, GI producers bear
the cost of developing and maintaining the reputation of
GI-denominated products, and thus are.vulnerable to reputational
"free riders" who identify their product by unduly evoking the GIs'
names (for example, for use on unrelated products or products
made with different ingredients). In contrast, free riders are not
part of and do not contribute to sustaining GI-denominated
markets. 147 Thus, free riders do not share the same concerns with
respect to the impact of subpar products on the long-term
reputation of GI-denominated products and markets. 148 Yet,
subpar products could easily impact the market for
GI-denominated products.149 These considerations apply to any
replicas of EU GI-denominated products produced anywhere
outside the relevant GI-denominated region, including replicas of
U.S. products in markets outside the relevant regions in the U.S.
For example, wine-makers from Napa have sought and obtained
protection for the name "Napa Valley" under sui generis protection
for GIs in China after a decade of challenges in preventing the use
of the name "Napa" in China, specifically due to fears of dilution
of the name in Asia and the global marketplace in general.150 Napa
Valley is also a registered GI in Thailand.15 1
The second, and perhaps even more important, argument in
support of GI protection is that GIs convey important information to
consumers. Notably, GIs are distinctive signs that allow consumers
to identify the geographical origin of the products. As such, GIs
convey a host of information about GI-denominated products that
goes along with the geographical origin, including the quality of the
raw materials, ingredients, methods of production, and so forth. 152 In
this respect, the argument in favor of GI protection is that GIs reduce
the information asymmetries between producers and consumers and
146. See Calboli, Markets, Culture and Terroir, supra note 19, at 448-49.
147. Ritzert, supra note 72, at 214-20.
148. See Agdomar, supra note 72, at 586-87 (summarizing the impact of counterfeit
products on source communities); Ritzert, supra note 72, at 214-17.
149. Calboli, Markets, Culture and Terroir, supra note 19, at 448-49; Ritzert, supra
note 72, at 212-20.
150. See Sasha Paulsen, China Agrees to Protect Napa Valley Wine Name, NAPA
VALLEY REG. (Oct. 11, 2012), http://napavalleyregister.com/news/local/china-agrees-to
-protect-napa-valley-wine-namelarticle_0c4f86e8-142e-11e2-942f-00la4bcf887a.html.
151. Press Release, Napa Valley Vintners, Napa Valley Vintners Announce GI Status
Approval in Thailand (Nov. 29, 2011), http://napavintners.com/press/press.release
detail.asp?IDNews=3421052.
152. Agdomar, supra note 72, at 577, 586-87; see Hughes, supra note 9, at 352.
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enable consumers to distinguish between products of different
quality and characteristics, or simply between products of similar
quality and characteristics, within the same generic-type
product' 53-for example, Chianti wine versus Napa wine or red wine
produced in Iowa. Moreover, GIs can offer useful information about
the "health-related" quality and other important aspects of the
GI-denominated products. For example, by offering relevant
information about the ingredients and/or practices that go into
making the products as part of the products' origin, GIs can play an
important role in the selection process that drives consumers to
choose certain products over others.15 4 In this respect, GIs can
identify (and potentially reward) those producers who invest in
friendly environmental, health, and labor-related policies. GIs also
hold producers accountable for environmental, public-health-related,
and other types of damages to a region, country, or larger
community.s55 In particular, GIs can assist in reducing possible
"contagion effects" due to accidents in a given geographical market-
for example, consumers could avoid contaminated cured meat or
cheese from a given area, as was the case with the contaminated
"mozzarella" scandal in Campania (Italy) several years ago. 56
Ultimately, GIs may contribute to the creation of environmentally
sustainable production methods as GI producers realize the
importance of maintaining the well-being of the region-the land,
water, air, and the like.157
153. Agdomar, supra note 72, at 588; see Angela Tregear & Georges Giraud,
Geographical Indications, Consumers and Citizens, in LABELS OF ORIGIN FOR FOOD: LOCAL
DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL RECOGNITION 63, 66-67 (Elizabeth Barham & Bertil Sylvander
eds., 2011) (suggesting that overcoming this information asymmetry can be a boon for
buyers). Asymmetrical information places consumers in a weaker position because
consumers cannot optimize their choices due to the lack of a full set of information. GIs
constitute methods of improving communication as they signal quality and expertise and
enable consumers to distinguish between premium quality products and low-end products.
Tregear & Giraud, supra, at 66-67; Agdomar, supra note 72, at 588.
154. Agdomar, supra note 72, at 590 (observing that wine connoisseurs rely heavily on
source identification to select the wine they drink); see Luisa Menapace et al., Consumers'
Preference for Geographical Origin Labels- Evidence from the Canadian Olive Oil Market, 38
EUR. REV. AGRIC. EcON. 193, 209-10 (2011) (concluding that Canadian consumers are willing to
pay a premium for olive oil with geographical indication).
155. Elizabeth Barham et al., Geographical Indications in the USA, in LABELS OF
ORIGIN FOR FOOD: LOCAL DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL RECOGNITION 122, 126-27 (Elizabeth
Barham & Bertil Sylvander eds., 2011); Agdomar, supra note 72, at 588.
156. See Michael McCarthy & John Phillips, Italy's Toxic Waste Crisis, the Mafia-
and the Scandal of Europe Mozzarella, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 22, 2008), http://www.indepe
ndent.co.uk/news/worldleurope/italys-toxic-waste-crisis-the-mafia-ndash-and-the-scandal
-of-europes-mozzarella-799289.html (explaining that many Italians linked the high levels
of pollutant chemicals found in buffalo milk to a waste management crisis in Campania, a
province in Italy renowned for buffalo milk production).
157. See Sarah Bowen & Ana Valenzuela Zapata, Geographical Indications, Terroir,
and Socioeconomic and Ecological Sustainability: The Case of Tequila, 25 J. RURAL STUD.
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Based on these premises, offering adequate protection to GIs
does translate into protecting producers' ability to offer correct
information to consumers. In contrast, not protecting GIs or
offering a weak protection to GIs-protection that would tolerate
confusingly similar or diluting uses of geographical terms-could
lead to the erosion of the GIs' ability to signal the origin of
GI-denominated products.15 8 This, in turn, could lead to consumer
confusion as to the actual origin and quality of the GI-denominated
products. It could also lead to GI genericide, as the GIs would lose
their distinctive meaning of "geographical area" and "geographical
origin." Ultimately, offering weak GI protection would deprive
consumers of important sources of information about the qualities
associated with geographical origin and the manufacturing
process of the GI-denominated products.159 As I noted in Part III,
the EU has raised these arguments in the defense of EU GIs
outside the EU. Notably, the EU has repeatedly argued that the
use of EU GIs outside their accurate EU geographical context
could dilute the distinctiveness of the names and lead to their
genericide. Yet, as noted above, it should also be said that, to a
certain extent, the EU exaggerates the claim that EU GIs may
become generic when these terms are used along with delocalizers
such as "type," "style," "like," and so on. Moreover, it should not be
forgotten that, under the EU PGI scheme, EU producers
themselves are allowed to partially delocalize the production of
PGI-denominated products and still retain the (exclusive) right to
use the geographical term to identify the products. 160 Thus, the EU
claims are driven not only by the concern that unauthorized users
would dilute the distinctiveness of EU GIs (when these GIs are
used inaccurately), but also (and primarily in the cases of PGIs) by
the desire to maintain the exclusive control over any use of the
terms that are registered as EU GIs. Ultimately, these terms
remain an instrumental marketing tool for EU producers in
securing a competitive advantage in the global market due to the
108, 117-18 (2009); Dwijen Rangnekar, Indications of Geographical Origin in Asia: Legal
and Policy Issues to Resolve, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS IN A CHANGING WORLD 273, 293 (Ricardo Mel4ndez-Ortiz & Pedro
Roffe eds., 2009).
158. See Marie-Vivienne, supra note 73, at 194 (noting that the EU has promulgated
newer, stricter regulations in order to strength GI protection of agricultural products);
Agdomar, supra note 72, at 545-46 (explaining that the appellation of basmati rice does not
receive GI protection in the U.S.).
159. Ricolfi, supra note 12, at 239.
160. Hughes, supra note 9, at 324-25 (showing that the 2006 Origins Regulation
requires PGI-labeled products to be produced, processed, or prepared in the geographical
area but need not be sourced from the geographical area); Agdomar, supra note 72, at 580-
81 (discussing the EU's argument that weak GI protection under TRIPS permits free riding
and risks genericide).
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tradition that these terms carry with them-a tradition that is
often associated with authenticity and high quality. 16 1
Moreover, even though GIs can serve an important role for
local development and offer important information to consumers,
this should not cloud the reality that GI protection can easily be
abused, just like other types of intellectual property rights. Once
again, such abuse can arise (and does arise, as I just noted)
primarily when GI protection attaches to products that are not
fully originating from GI-denominated areas.162 Unfortunately,
international intellectual property agreements have drifted
towards an interpretation of GIs that is less "purely" connected to
the geographical area from which the products actually originate.
As I noted in Part II, the definition of GIs under Article 22 of
TRIPS,1 63 and now also under the revised text of the Lisbon
Agreements,164 have moved away from a strict territorial
requirement for the recognition of exclusive right in GI names.
Instead, it seems to be the norm today that GI-denominated
products can lawfully originate, in part, from outside their (often
widely acclaimed and advertised) GI-denominated regions. The
same consideration applies to the definition of PGIs under the
aforementioned EU Regulations, 65 and even with respect to the
requirements in the regulation of appellations of origin for wine
under U.S. laws. 66 In other words, GI-denominated products can
be partially made with ingredients and/or labor from outside
GI-denominated regions, or one or more production steps in the
overall manufacturing of these products can also occur outside
these regions. However, as I supported before, this development is
inconsistent with the rationale of GI protection. 167 In particular,
when GIs identify products that do not fully originate from the
regions, GI protection seems to transform into a disguised barrier,
an exclusive right to use and evoke geographical names even when
these names are not fully accurate to the products they identify.
161. See discussion supra Part III (describing the EU's interest in regaining exclusive
control over EU GIs in order to safeguard global market share of EU GI-labeled products
by maintaining EU GIs' affiliation with authenticity and quality).
162. See Michael Blackeney, Geographical Indications: What Do They Indicate?, 6
WIPO J. 50, 50-51 (2014) (noting that pigs used in the production of Parma ham may
originate from countries outside of central Italy); Calboli, In Territorio Veritas, supra note
19, at 61-62.
163. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 22(1).
164. See Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement, supra note 52, art. 2(1)(i), (ii).
165. EU Agricultural Products and Foodstuff Regulation, supra note 91, art. 5(2), at
8; EU Wine Regulation, supra note 92, art. 34(1)(b), at 18; EU Spirits Regulation, supra
note 93, art. 15(1), at 21.
166. 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.26(b), 4.39(i)(1)-(2) (2015).
167. See, e.g., Calboli, In Territorio Veritas, supra note 19, at 63.
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This goes beyond the original rationale for GI protection, as the
very rationale of this protection rests on the link with the terroir
(intended as a deep connection between the land and the
characteristics and qualities of the products).168 Thus, the primary
condition for the coherent protection of GIs is a strict terroir-based
approach, which is reflected in a narrow interpretation of the
"essentiality" (ideally the "exclusivity") of this territorial linkage.
On the other hand, when the territorial linkage between the
products and GI-denominated regions is enforced, and GIs identify
products effectively coming from GI-denominated regions, then
GIs can effectively promote local development and offer accurate
information to consumers. 1Moreover, against critics' arguments
that GIs are anti-competitive and disguised subsidies to
agriculture and food-related sectors, 170 it should be noted that GIs
do not prevent competition in the market for similar products.171
Recognizing GIs simply prevents producers outside the
GI-denominated region from using GIs to identify their own
products. Still, these producers can produce the same types of
products (red wine, blue veined cheese, balsamic vinegar, etc.) and
market those products under trademarks or perhaps different
regional names. 172
In this respect, rather than foreclosing competition, GIs can
promote competition between GI producers and producers in
non-GI- denominated regions. In turn, this can promote innovation
and creativity in the market for the generic-type products-for
example, in the wine markets. As I noted in another article, it was
not until after Australia conceded to EU pressure and ceased its use
of several terms protected as GIs in the EU that the Australian wine
industry truly grew, because producers began to invest in their own
local names, which became symbols of excellent wines worldwide.1 73
Producers in non-GI-denominated regions could even decide to
register their own GIs. This is precisely what has happened in
several regions in the EU with respect to similar products. And it is
168. See, e.g., Calboli, Markets, Culture and Terroir, supra note 19, at 438-42; Hughes,
supra note 9, at 352; Raustiala & Munzer, supra note 12, at 368-73.
169. Calboli, Markets, Culture and Terroir, supra note 19, at 460.
170. See, e.g., Raustiala & Munzer, supra note 12, at 351, 362 (admitting that GI
protection could be accepted within the limits of confusion under the general provision in
Article 22 of TRIPS).
171. Gangjee, Quibbling Siblings, supra note 120, at 1268; Agdomar, supra note 72, at
591.
172. Calboli, Markets, Culture and Terroir, supra note 19, at 459-60; Agdomar, supra
note 72, at 590-91 (noting that in 2002, Kraft had to change the name of its grated cheese
from "Parmigiano-Reggiano" to "Pamesello Italiano" but was still able to produce the same
style cheese).
173. See Calboli, Expanding the Protection, supra note 19, at 200-01.
406 [53:2
TIME TO SAY LOCAL CHEESE
what has happened in the U.S. with respect to viticultural areas.
These trends confirm that GI protection is not necessarily an
anti-competitive tool but rather an instrument to distinguish
products based on geographical origin and in turn provide additional
information to consumers about this origin and the associated
quality.1 74 In addition, protecting GIs does not erase regional
competition between producers in the same region.175 For example,
the recognition of "Napa" or "Sonoma" as a protected term does not
eliminate competition between the local producers of wine in the
Napa or Sonoma regions.176
Still, as I noted earlier, accepting the importance of a system
of GI protection should not translate into prohibiting all
unauthorized uses of GIs. In particular, GI protection should not
prohibit reference to GIs by unauthorized parties describing and
comparing their generic products with GI-denominated ones' 77-
for instance, comparing sparkling wines with Champagne. Were it
otherwise, GI protection would essentially become an unjustified
barrier to entry for competitors. Moreover, a system of unlimited
GI protection would conflict with the right to commercial speech
and, more generally, the freedom of expression. For example,
unlimited GI protection would not be compatible with the test
established by the U.S. Supreme Court 78 for non-misleading
commercial speech, 79 nor with the principle of freedom of
174. I am grateful to Reto Hilty for insightful conversation on this point and for
suggesting that a more extended empirical research targeted at surveying the existence of
different GIs for similar products in different regions and countries could further
strengthen this argument. See also Felix Addor, Nikolaus Thumm & Alexandra Grazioli,
Geographical Indications: Important Issues for Industrialized and Developing Countries,
IPTS REP., May 2003, at 24, 26 (remarking that GI protection only prevents manufacturers
from other regions from selling the same product using the same GI but does not prevent
other regions from selling the same product).
175. See Calboli, Markets, Culture and Terroir, supra note 19, at 460.
176. See, e.g., Patricia Stone, 2013 'Top 10" Napa Valley Wineries, GLOBAL
ADVERTURESS, http://www.globaladventuress.com/2013-top-10-napa-valley-wineries/ (last
visited Nov. 20, 2015) (listing the top 10 out of 400 wine producers in Napa Valley: Robert
Sinskey Vineyards, Quintessa, Joseph Phelps, Castello di Amorossa, Schramsberg,
Anomaly, Cliff Lede, Palmaz, Venge, Duckhorn, Viader, Artesa, and Domaine Carneros);
13 Sonoma County Wineries You Should Know, SONOMA COUNTY, http://www.sonoma
county.com/articles/13-sonoma-county-wineries-you-should-know (last visited Nov. 20,
2015) (listing the following wineries: Rodney Strong Vineyards, Paradise Ridge Winery,
Buena Vista Winery, Fort Ross Vineyard and Tasting Room, Joseph Phelps Freestone
Vineyards, Ferrari-Carano Vineyards & Winery, Truett-Hurst Winery, Matanzas Creek
Winery, St. Francis Winery & Vineyards, Ram's Gate Winery, Korbel Champagne Cellars,
Lynmar Estate, and Francis Ford Coppola Winery).
177. This argument is a staple argument in my position towards GI protection. See
Calboli, Markets, Culture and Terroir, supra note 19, at 460-61.
178. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
179. Harry N. Niska, Note, The European Union Trips Over the U.S. Constitution: Can
the First Amendment Save the Bologna That Has a First Name?, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
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expression in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.180 As I elaborate in the next Part, these concerns could be
resolved, with respect to the TTIP negotiations, by adopting a
system of protection that permits the unauthorized use of GIs
when referring to products by appending "style," "like," or
"type."181 Naturally, GI supporters tend to dislike any
unauthorized use of GIs and oppose these descriptive and
comparative uses, as is the case in the EU Regulations, which
explicitly prohibit such uses. In particular, under EU law, GIs
cannot be used with any delocalizers even when consumers are not
confused as to the actual geographical source of the products. 182
However, as I noted before, permitting the use of GIs by
competitors or third parties to describe similar products or to
compare these products to GI-denominated ones remains a critical
component of a truly balanced system of protection of GI
protection, in which GIs are protected based on their public
functions as local incentives and conveyers of information to
consumers.
V. TIME TO SAY LOCAL CHEESE? CRAFTING A CANADA-STYLE
WIN-WIN SOLUTION FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
In this Part, I advocate in favor of adopting a compromising
solution on GIs as part of the TTIP negotiations, namely a solution
similar to that adopted in CETA-the FTA recently concluded
between the EU and Canada. Canada is a country that has
historically adopted a position on GIs similar to the U.S.-that is,
Canada has traditionally opposed the EU approach on GIs. The
solution on GIs reached in CETA represents a win-win solution
both for Canada and the EU. Thus, the U.S. could adopt a similar
solution as a viable model in the TTIP. In turn, this solution would
improve local developments and the accuracy of information
offered to consumers on both sides of the Atlantic.
413, 440-41 (2004); see Piazza's Seafood World, LLC v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 752-53 (5th
Cir. 2006) (affirming a lower court's application of the Central Hudson test to determine
that the labelling of Chinese catfish as "Cajun" was not inherently misleading commercial
speech).
180. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 10(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
181. This position is compatible with TRIPS. See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 24. But
see id. art. 23 (forbidding GI use for wines and spirits with these "de-localizers"). As I have
advocated before, the current text of Article 23 could be changed in favor of also permitting
descriptive and comparative uses of GIs identifying wines and spirits. See Calboli, Markets,
Culture and Terroir, supra note 19, at 460.
182. See, e.g., EU Agricultural Products and Foodstuff Regulation, supra note 91, art.
13, at 11; EU Wine Regulation, supra note 92, art. 45, at 21.
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The EU's requests to the U.S. as part of the TTIP are
summarized in a Position Paper published by the EU.183 On a
general level, the EU is requesting that the U.S. guarantee "an
appropriate level of protection for EU GIs" and provide a system
of "[a]dministrative enforcement against the misuse of EU GIs."'1 84
The requests do not include that the U.S. adopt sui generis GI
protection like the EU-as long as the U.S. grants protection to
several EU GIs "directly through the agreement."185 As part of the
system requested by the EU, this protection would be based on the
principle of reciprocity and would "include both European and
American GI names." 8 6 As has been the case in CETA, however,
the current list of GIs under consideration includes exclusively EU
GIs. Still, the Position Paper highlights how clawing-back certain
EU GIs is highly problematic for the U.S. These GIs include those
names that the U.S. deems generic and are used by U.S.
businesses (or by those doing business in the U.S.),s'8 such as
several cheese names such as "Feta" and "Asiago." For these
names, the EU proposes "[s]pecific arrangements"18 8 between the
EU and the U.S., like those negotiated in CETA. Finally, the EU
is seeking added protection-that is, "exclusive" protection-for a
series of names for wines "included in Annex II of the EU and U.S.
Agreement concluded in 2006 on 'trade in wine."'189 In this
agreement, the EU and the U.S. agreed on the terms of protection
of several EU GIs for wines in the U.S. Still, the EU is now
requesting additional protection for these names. Moreover, the
EU is seeking "[p]rotection for additional EU GI spirits names,"
hoping to reach a similar agreement on spirits.1 90
Overall, the requests advanced by the EU in the TTIP are
largely the same requests presented to other countries as part of
183. See EU Position Paper on GIs, supra note 9.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. In this respect, it should be noted that (unfortunately) EU companies also take
advantage of the non-protection of EU GIs in the U.S. to market products using EU names
(such as "Feta"), even though the products do not originate from EU GI-denominated areas.
This demonstrates another contradiction in the GI debate and illustrates how the GI
controversy remains essentially about market access and sales. For example, the French
company, Pr~sident, sells "Feta" cheese in the U.S. due to the lack of protection for the
"Feta" term in the U.S. See PRESIDENT, http://presidentcheese.com/cheese
/productsfeta.php (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). Yet, the term "Feta" has been a protected
PDO under EU law since 2002. See DOOR, Denomination Information, EUR. COMMISSION
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/registeredName.html?denominationId=876
(last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
188. See EU Position Paper on GIs, supra note 9.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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their bilateral or plurilateral FTA negotiations. This includes
FTAs between the EU and countries in Asia, Africa, and South
America.1 91 In exchange, the EU has offered facilitated access to
the EU market for several products from these countries. The EU
would certainly offer similar facilitations to the U.S. as part of the
TTIP. For example, the EU could facilitate the imports of U.S.
agricultural products and other products (for example,
hormone-free beef), and at the same time reduce certain
certification requirements or tariffs for U.S. products (for example,
on dairy products).1 92 The EU and the U.S. reached a similar
trade-off as part of the 2006 Agreement on Trade in Wine, in which
the U.S. consented to clawing-back several names of EU GIs for
wines, and the EU accepted in exchange the imports of wines made
with U.S. winemaking practices that were previously not accepted
under EU standardS.1 93
Not surprisingly, however, the EU's requests on GI protection
in the TTIP have so far been met with fierce resistance by some
U.S. industries, primarily the dairy and meat industries. In
particular, the U.S. Consortium for Common Food Names has
strongly opposed and emphatically contested the EU's request to
claw-back names that are, in the view of the Consortium, common
names in the U.S.1 94 As demonstrated by the letters sent by U.S.
Senators and Representatives discussed in the Introduction, this
191. See TPP, Intellectual Property Chapter, supra note 24 (providing instruction to
TPP members in navigating the murky depths of endless, potentially contradictory
international agreements governing GI protection). For comprehensive information and
reference to legal documents regarding EU FTAs, see Trade Agreements, EUR. COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eultrade/policy/countries-and-regions/agreements/index-en.htm#_europe
(last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
192. This observation remains my speculation, based on trade concessions in other
FTAs, and in the 2006 Wine Agreement, supra note 60.
193. Id. art. 6(1) (allowing the sale of U.S.-produced wines in the EU, even though such
sales were previously not permitted in the EU, in exchange for "seeking to change the legal
status" of several quasi-generic, wine-related indications). Article 6(1) of the Agreement
outlines the terms of U.S. commitment, which is further detailed in ALCOHOL & TOBACCO
TAX & TRADE BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INDUSTRY CIRCULAR No. 2006-1,
IMPACT OF THE U.S./EU WINE AGREEMENT ON CERTIFICATES OF LABEL APPROVAL FOR WINE
LABELS WITH A SEMI-GENERIC NAME OR RETSINA (2006), http://www.ttb.gov
/industry-circulars/archives/2006/06-01.html.
194. See Threats to Common Food Names More Widespread in EU Trade Deals and
Other Geographical Indications Policies, CONSORTIUM FOR COMMON FOOD NAMES (Mar. 19,
2015), http://www.commonfoodnames.com/threats-to-common-food-names-more-wide
spread-in-eu-trade-deals-and-other-geographical-indications-policies/ (stating that the
CCFN has taken action in twenty countries to protect common foods names from efforts by
the EU to claw-back now generic names such as "parmesan," "feta," and "bologna"); U.S.
Dairy Industry Drives Home Concerns on Geographical Indications, supra note 121
(opposing the EU's approach to GI protections because it would cause U.S. producers and
others to relinquish their right to use generic food names like "fontina," "muenster," and
"gorgonzola").
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resistance has translated into political opposition against the EU's
requests.1 95 In addition, the U.S. dairy industry has vocally
opposed the possibility of reaching a CETA-type solution in the
TTIP-a solution that has been mentioned as a possibility and an
example by EU negotiators-arguing that this solution would
benefit the EU more than the U.S. In February 2015, the Brussels
Representative for the U.S. Dairy Export Council, Ms. Maike
Moellers, publicly stated that,
Since the conclusion of the EU-Canada agreement, we have
heard from the EU side again and again that the agreement
with Canada on GIs could be a model for the TTIP. This is a
notion that we absolutely reject . .. [because] U.S. producers
as well as others in the world [would need to] relinquish[]
their right to use long-standing generic food names, such as
"asiago," "feta," "fontina," "munster" and "gorgonzola."1 96
The U.S. dairy industry's fierce opposition to the EU's request
with respect to GI protection has also led U.S. diplomats and trade
representatives to suggest that the discussion over GIs should be
removed from the TTIP negotiations altogether.'97 Naturally, the
EU opposes such suggestions as it is in the best interest of the EU
to address GI protection in the U.S. as part of a larger package of
trade-related issues. In this larger context, the EU has better
leverage to obtain more protection for EU GIs from the U.S. in
exchange for concessions in other areas.
Still, despite the vocal opposition against a CETA-type
solution in the TTIP, a close analysis of the GI provisions in the
recently concluded intellectual property chapter in CETA
indicates that a similar solution in the TTIP could be a suitable
and desirable solution. For example, when Ms. Moellers publicly
opposed a CETA-type solution in the TTIP, she went on to state
195. See discussion supra Part I (stating that U.S. Senators and Representatives have
written to the Secretary of Agriculture and U.S. Trade Representative, urging opposition
to EU requests, namely restrictions on the use of EU GIs in the U.S.); see also Alan
Matthews, Geographical Indications (GIs) in the US-EU TTIP Negotiations, CAP REFORM
(June 19, 2014), http://capreform.eu/geographical-indications-gis-in-the-us-eu-ttip-negot
iations/ (summarizing the debate in the TTIP and offering a detailed account of the
negotiations between the EU and Canada in CETA). It is also relevant to note that CETA
covers exclusively agricultural products and foodstuffs, and that GIs for wines and spirits
are outside the scope of CETA. These GIs are already protected under the 2004 EU-Canada
Wines and Spirits Agreement, which is similar to the 2006 Wine Agreement between the
U.S. and the EU. See Agreement Between the European Community and Canada on Trade
in Wines and Spirit Drinks, Can. -EU, Feb. 6, 2004, 2004 O.J. (L35) 3; see also 2006 Wine
Agreement, supra note 60.
196. U.S. Dairy Industry Drives Home Concerns on Geographical Indications, supra
note 121.
197. See id. (noting a dairy representative's suggestion that GI negotiations should be
moved to a separate forum).
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that the U.S. "believe[s] that products with a very specific
geographic designation included in their compound name, such as
'Gouda Holland', can be protected ... while the single word 'gouda'
clearly remains unrestricted and in free usage." 198 Yet, perhaps
Ms. Moellers did not read the GI provisions in CETA before her
speech, as the word "Gouda" does indeed remain free to use for
Canadian businesses and everyone else under CETA. Notably,
Canada agreed to protect only the terms "Gouda Holland" and not
the single term "Gouda."199 Accordingly, rather than categorically
reject the idea of a CETA-type solution, Ms. Moellers could have
used CETA as an example of what the U.S. could obtain in terms
of exceptions and limitations to the protection of EU GIs in the
TTIP. In other words, Ms. Moellers and other U.S. industry
representatives could review the GI provisions in CETA more
closely and realize that these provisions are less EU friendly than
what they, and other GI opponents, believe the provisions to be.
In addition to the term "Gouda," CETA provides that other
selected terms related to names of cheeses remain free to use for
Canadian businesses. These terms are: "Brie," as only the
combination "Brie de Meux" is protected in CETA, and "Edam," as
only the combination "Edam Holland" is protected.200 Similarly
(much to the despair of this author who is born in the beautiful
city of Bologna and cringes any time she hears the word Bologna
associated with products not originating from Bologna), the terms
"Mortadella" and "Bologna" are not protected in CETA with
respect to cured meat-only the combination "Mortadella Bologna"
is protected.201 Several more exceptions apply. For example,
Canada and the EU have agreed that Canada will not protect the
term "Noix de Grenoble." Likely a concession to Budweiser,
Canada will also not protect the name "Budejovicke," a registered
EU GI, 2 0 2 which prevents any conflicts with the registered mark
"Budweiser" in Canada. Moreover, CETA permits the free use of
several other beer names in their English and French translations.
For instance, the terms "Munich beer" and "Bavarian beer" are not
protected under CETA. 203 CETA additionally carves out the
possibility to freely use the following French and English
translations for non-beer products that are protected as GIs in the
EU: "Valencia oranges," "Tiroler bacon," "Parmesan," and
198. Id.
199. CETA, Intellectual Property Chapter, supra note 25, art. 7, Annex I.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
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"Blackforest Ham." 204 Only the original terms in Spanish, German,
and Italian are protected and Canadian businesses cannot use
these original terms. Finally-a traditional concern for "new
world" business with respect to any GI-related new law-the
protection offered in CETA does not undermine the validity of
existing Canadian trademarks. In brief, CETA explicitly respects
existing trademark rights, regardless of the fact that these marks
may be registered EU GIs, and embraces the principle of "first in
time, first in right."205
Certainly, Canada does commit to protect a long list of EU
GIs-173 names to be exact-under CETA (even though, in
principle CETA grants the same protection to both "EU and
Canadian GIs"). 206 CETA also requires that signatories protect
these terms "even where the true origin of the product is indicated
or the geographical indication is used in translation or
accompanied by expressions such as 'kind[,'] 'type[,'] 'style[,']
'imitation' or the like."207 This principle represents one of the most
relevant victories for the EU in CETA and aligns with the
protection of GIs under the EU Regulations. However, Canada
secured a number of important exceptions to this protection with
respect to several terms that are commonly used in North America
to identify certain types of cheese, even though these terms are
registered EU GIs. Notably, specific exceptions apply to the
following names under CETA: "Asiago," "Feta," "Fontina,"
"Gorgonzola," and "Munster."208 In particular, Canadian
businesses that are currently using these names are
grandfathered in and can continue using these terms without any
changes to their existing products. 209 Future users will also be able
to use these terms so long as these terms are "accompanied by
expressions such as 'kind[,'] 'type[,'] 'style[,'] 'imitation' or the
like." 210
Ultimately, the GI provisions in CETA demonstrate that both
the EU and Canada were willing to compromise on several issues
relating to GIs in order to reach a mutually convenient solution in
their FTA. In particular, even though Canada certainly
accommodates several of the EU's requests, CETA is far from the
result of an absolute capitulation by Canada to the EU. Instead,
the provisions adopted in CETA explicitly demonstrate that the
204. Id. art. 7.6, Annex II(a).
205. Id. art. 7.6(5).
206. Id. art. 7, Annex I (including exclusive terms from the EU).
207. Id. art. 7.4.
208. Id. art. 7.6(1)-(2).
209. Id. art. 7.6(2).
210. Id. art. 7.6(1), Annex I.
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EU is willing to make exceptions to the level of protection that is
traditionally offered to GIs under the EU Regulations as part of
FTA negotiations with countries that oppose the same level of GI
protection.211 Accordingly, despite Ms. Moellers's emphatic
opposition to a CETA-type solution in the TTIP, U.S. negotiators
should pursue such a solution, as it represents a viable solution
for the U.S.
Certainly, U.S. businesses will continue to strongly oppose
additional GI protection and, above all, clawing-back terms that
are protected as GIs in the EU but are currently free to use in the
U.S. Still, this opposition should not distract negotiators from the
possible benefit of a compromising solution in the TTIP. First, in
the U.S. as much as it is in Canada, only a handful of names-
primarily related to cheeses-are truly problematic from the
perspective of U.S. businesses. These terms are "Asiago," "Feta,"
"Fontina," "Gorgonzola," and "Munster." Yet, as it has been
negotiated under CETA, these terms could be granted specific
exceptions in the U.S. as part of the provisions in the TTIP. 2 1 2
These exceptions could include the possibility of grandfathering in
current users, as well as permitting future producers to use these
terms accompanied by delocalizing expressions such as "like,"
"style," etc. Like in CETA, these exceptions would minimize the
transaction costs of recognizing the validity of these terms as
protected terms in the U.S. Existing businesses could go about
their business as usual, and new businesses could still use the
names to compare or describe their products-for example using
labels such as "Gorgonzola-style" for blue veined cheese made in
Wisconsin (or Michigan or California). Consumers would have
additional choices: they could purchase the American-made
(grandfathered) Gorgonzola, the new blue veined cheese
Gorgonzola- style from Michigan, or the original Italian
Gorgonzola. Equally important, consumers would have more
accurate information about the origin of the products they
purchase. For instance, consumers may learn (if they did not
know, and if they are interested in knowing) that Gorgonzola is a
cheese that was originally created, and traditionally originates
from, a region of Italy. They may also learn that they can purchase
the Italian cheese in the U.S. as well as similarly made cheese
produced in the U.S. (or Australia, New Zealand, etc.).
Still, U.S. negotiators should not concede to the EU and accept
the prohibition of the use of GIs in comparative advertising or in
211. See Matthews, supra note 195.
212. See CETA, Intellectual Property Chapter, supra note 25, art. 7.6(1)-(2) (granting
specific exceptions to the terms "Asiago," "Feta," "Fontina," "Gorgonzola," and "Munster").
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circumstances in which the names are accompanied by
delocalizing terms such as "like," "type," "imitation," etc. Under
CETA, only the most contested names, such as "Asiago," "Fontina,"
etc., are granted this exception. However, CETA accepts enhanced
protection for GIs and prohibits comparative and descriptive uses
as a general rule. This should not be accepted in the TTIP. As
discussed before, providing for these exceptions remains crucial to
safeguard competition in the marketplace and freedom of
expression. Thus, U.S. negotiators should convince the EU to
retain these exceptions for all and not just some EU GIs. In
particular, U.S. negotiators should negotiate that the following
unauthorized uses of GIs should be permitted: (a) the use of EU
GIs in comparative advertising, including on product packaging,
to indicate that the products that are being advertised and offered
for sale are equivalent, also from quality standpoint, to the
GI-denominated products that are produced outside the
GI-denominated region; and (b) the use of EU GIs in comparative
advertising, including on product packaging, to indicate that the
products that are being advertised and offered for sale are similar
in kind, although not equivalent in quality, with respect to the
GI-denominated products. 213
Similarly, U.S. negotiators should maintain that common
terms such as "Gouda," "Parmesan," and "Brie" remain free to use
as single terms by any users, presently or in the future, like it has
been negotiated under CETA. The U.S. should agree to protect
these terms only when they are accompanied by European
geographical names, such as "Gouda Holland" and "French Brie."
Ultimately, despite the opposition of representatives of some
U.S. industries, a CETA-type solution and a higher level of
protection for GIs in the U.S. could considerably benefit both U.S.
consumers and businesses. First, the recognition of GIs (also
under a U.S. trademark-type system) will offer more information
about the products to consumers and therefore permit them to
make more informed decisions when purchasing products in the
marketplace. Second, a renewed attention to GI protection in the
213. I thank Ansgar Ohly for useful conversation on this point during the recent
workshop The Present and Future of GI protection in the EU, Max-Planck-Institute for
Innovation and Competition, Berlin, October 29-31, 2015. Professor Ohly listed three
situations in which the unauthorized use of GIs should be permitted, also in the EU, with
respect to the potential extension to GI protection to non-agricultural products: (1) when
producers in the same area produce similar products but without following the product
specification, as long as it is clear that these products are different than those produced by
authorized GI producers; (2) when producers outside the area produce qualitatively
identical products, as long as the actual origin of the products is clearly disclosed; (3) when
producers outside the area produce substitute, yet qualitatively different, products, as long
as the actual origin of the products is clearly disclosed.
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U.S. will also enhance the role of "locality" and thus promote U.S.
local businesses and local development. This could lead to a higher
number of local products sold both nationally and internationally.
Local producers will also invest more resources in the local
economy and be motivated to create new varieties of local products
to compete in the international market rather than copying
existing EU products. For example, why couldn't Wisconsin (or
Michigan, or Vermont, or California, etc.) cheese-makers develop
local cheeses (and simply stop producing replicas of
EU-denominated cheeses) and sell those in the local, national, and
international markets? Cheese-makers should follow the example
of wine-makers in the U.S. Notably, wine-makers in many regions,
not only in Napa and Sonoma, invest in the quality of their local
products and promote these products in the local, national, and
(when possible) international markets. As a result, the status of
U.S. wines has risen globally. In contrast, many cheese-makers in
the U.S. seem to prefer to imitate existing European cheeses
rather than focusing on developing and marketing local
specialties. As a former resident of Wisconsin, I have been puzzled
for a decade over why the U.S. "Dairy Land"214 does not seem to
market any local cheese within and outside the state of Wisconsin.
The same observation applies to other states as local U.S.
cheese-makers rarely market their products with an emphasis on
their local U.S. origin and associated quality.215 Yet, Wisconsin,
Michigan, Ohio, etc., cheese-makers have the infrastructure to
produce excellent local cheese. Why not incentivize local producers
to innovate and create their own varieties of cheese and promote
these cheeses in the local, national, and international
marketplace? In addition, investing in local high quality products
214. See Wisconsin State Symbols, State Slogan, Wis. HIST. SocY,
http://www.wisconsinhistory.org/Content.aspx?dsNav-N:4294963828-4294963805&dsRec
ordDetails=R:CS2908 (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) ("Between 1870 and 1900, dairying rose
to a prominent place in Wisconsin agriculture. By World War I, Wisconsin ranked first in
the nation in dairy production. In 1940, the Wisconsin Legislature promoted the 'Dairy
State' reputation by placing the slogan, 'America's Dairyland,' on automobile license plates.
Today, Wisconsin produces 15% of the country's milk, 25% of its butter, and 30% of its
cheese.").
215. For a list of cheeses typically found in the U.S. (not specifically produced under
any trademark), see List of American Cheeses, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org
/wikilListofAmericancheeses (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). Interestingly, the U.S. does
produce several types of local cheeses, yet these cheeses are not widely known in the
international marketplace. Instead, U.S. businesses such as Kraft and other large
corporations are known outside the U.S. for their industrially made cheese-such as
Philadelphia cream cheese. See Heather Paxson, Locating Value in Artisan Cheese: Reverse
Engineering Terroir for New- World Landscapes, 112 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 444, 445-47,
449, 451 (2010) (discussing American cheese-makers' efforts to redefine "American cheese"
as a collection of locally produced artisan products in the face of U.S. local and global
reputation as an industrial cheese producer).
416 [ 53: 2
TIME TO SAY LOCAL CHEESE
could help supporting local workers in economic downturns, as
local, higher quality, products could be less impacted because local
purchasers may still continue to support local high quality
products also in difficult economic time.216
Ultimately, consumers across the world are becoming aware
of the importance of "place" and "quality" in the production of
many products, especially food related products. To a large extent,
U.S. consumers lead this trend.217 Thus, a more rigorous system of
GI protection also in the U.S. could promote better information for
consumers, and in turn promote local businesses committed to
high quality products. Naturally, providing added GI could add
costs in the short term to some U.S. businesses, as they may no
longer copying the name of European cheeses. But, in the long
term, this additional protection, and the resulting drive toward
(necessary) innovation and investment in local product quality
could promote a culture of high quality in the cheese and meat
industry also in the U.S. as it has been the case for long time in
the wine industry. Obviously, change is hard to accept, even more
so when it may involve even minor costs for existing businesses
that are used to operating under an established business routine.
Still change and innovation are beneficial for development,
including in the U.S.
Moreover, pragmatically speaking, a CETA-type solution in
the TTIP would grandfather in existing U.S. businesses; thus,
existing businesses would not be affected by this solution and
resulting changes. And, the costs of additional GI protection for
new businesses would be offset in the long term by the success of
local U.S. products both nationally and internationally.
Finally, one of the recurrent narratives against added
GI-protection in the U.S. is that many products currently "under
attack" by the E.U. are produced by immigrants that left the EU
generations ago and took with them the local savoir faire to
216. For example, Oscar Mayer's has recently announced the closing of seven of its
plants, including one in Madison, Wisconsin. The company, currently a subsidiary of Kraft
Heinz Food, is reducing plants in the attempts to save costs due to declining profits. See
Todd Richmond, Oscar Mayer's Madison Plant Among 7 Closing, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 4,
2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/nov/4/oscar-mayers-madison-plant
-among-7-closing/. The news has been greeted with sadness by Wisconsin politicians (as it
should) due to the loss of many jobs. However, could these jobs have been saved if the
company would have invested in higher-quality products made under local names?
217. U.S. members account today for a quarter of the worldwide membership of the
"Slow Food" movement. See About Us, SLOw FOOD USA, http://www.slowfoodusa.org/about
-us. Moreover, U.S. consumers are increasingly driven towards fresh and healthy food,
including in supermarket choices. See Joan Voight, As Americans Rush to Fresh Food,
Supermarket Chains Follows, CNBC (Oct. 8, 2012, 8:10 AM), http://www.cnbc.com
lid/49101716.
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replicated products in the "New World." In this respect, it is
certainly true that many conflicts related to GIs between the U.S.
(or Canada and other "New World" countries) and EU arise in the
context of products produced and distributed in the "New World"
by immigrant producers. Still, the number of anti-GI claims
purportedly made by "immigrants" is frequently exaggerated by
the anti-GI camp, as the immigrant narrative contributes to the
emotional rhetoric that characterizes the GI debate. Instead, most
of the businesses that produce replicas of GI products in the U.S.
today are large businesses (perhaps once upon a time founded by
an immigrant) or multinational corporations. 218 Accordingly, the
legitimacy of these "immigrant" claims is frequently questionable.
Nevertheless, a CETA-type solution would again leave intact the
rights of any existing users-from the multinationals to the small
businesses operated by immigrant producers. 219 Thus, despite its
rhetorical appeal, the "immigrants" argument does not seem to be
relevant for the TTIP negotiations.
Accordingly, considering that a CETA-style solution in the
TTIP could leave the rights of existing businesses intact and still
permit future users to use controversial names in association with
delocalizing terms, why is the U.S dairy and cured meat industry
so vehemently opposed to such a solution? Ultimately, it is clear
that this opposition rests on special interests, and the fear that
providing consumers with more accurate information may in turn
result in declining demand for non-authentic (and generally
lower-quality) products. Yet, these special interests do not serve
the long-term benefit of U.S. consumers or producers, as they
essentially oppose innovation and higher-quality products. Thus,
U.S. negotiators and politicians should not bow to these special
interests but consider the long-term gains that could derive from
a more rigorous protection of GIs in the U.S. when they
respectively negotiate and decide whether to support the TTIP
with their votes.
218. For a list of the companies that oppose EU GI protection in the TTIP, see Letter
from Various U.S. Food & Agricultural Industry Organizations to Michael Froman, Deputy
Nat'l Sec. Advisor for Int'l Econ. Affairs (May 20, 2013), http://www.arc2020.eu/wp
-content/uploads/2013/07/Letter-of-US-farm-organisations-on-the-EU-US-FTA-2013-05-20
-.TIP.pdf.
219. This Author (herself a first generation immigrant) finds much hypocrisy in the
"immigrant argument" that is repeatedly raised against clawing-back geographical
European terms. Moreover, when this argument is raised by "real" immigrants, she finds
that claiming a right to use the names of localities that immigrants have voluntarily left
(for many personal reasons) is problematic from a global justice standpoint. While
immigrants should be able to use the knowhow that they took from their motherlands and
produce similar (or even identical) products, they should not oppose (but in fact they should
promote and respect, in the view of this Author) the accurate use of geographical names of
the regions from which they and the products that they replicate originate.
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VI. CONCLUSION
GIs are, and will continue to be, an item that can easily
inflame trade debates at the national and international level. In
this Article, I recounted the debate that is currently taking place
between the U.S. and the EU as part of the TTIP negotiations and
advocated for the adoption of a CETA-type solution in the TTIP.
In particular, I advocated that the U.S. recognize and claw-back
several EU GIs as long as U.S. businesses could continue to use
these terms accompanied with expressions such as "kind," "type,"
"style," "imitation," and the like. In addition, I supported that the
U.S. should negotiate grandfathering clauses for current U.S.
producers of products identified with terms identical or similar to
EU GIs. The U.S. should also carve out "free uses" for some truly
generic terms (or terms for which a generic-type name does not
exist, such as "Parmesan" in the view of this author) and for the
English translation of terms that are protected GIs in their
original language. This solution, I argued, represents a sensible
middle ground both for the U.S. and the EU at this time, as is
evidenced by the fact that Canada (a country that has also
traditionally had a "skeptical" approach to GIs) and the EU found
this solution acceptable as part of CETA. Equally important, this
solution could represent a win-win solution both for international
trade and local development in the U.S. despite the opposition of
certain U.S. producers. The U.S. wine industry's success on a
global scale proves beyond doubt that GI protection can benefit
local development in the U.S. Thus, why should we allow special
interests to continue stifling the GI debate in the U.S. for fear of
short-term costs and resistance to change and innovation? These
special interests are, in the long term, detrimental to economic
development for U.S. producers in general and ultimately run
against more accurate information for consumers about the actual
geographical origin of the products offered for sale in the
marketplace. Accordingly, U.S. Senators and Representatives
should carefully consider the implication of their support (and
their no-compromising rhetoric) for these special interests, as
these interests do not promote the best interests for economic
development, innovation, and consumer protection in the U.S.
Instead, our Senators and Representatives should seriously assess
the benefits that can derive both to U.S. consumers and producers
from a more rigorous approach to the rules on the protection of
geographical named in the U.S. In conclusion, it may be time to
say "local cheese!" and smile at GIs also in the U.S. and agree to a
compromising GI solution as part of the TTIP negotiations.
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